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ABSTRACT	  
	  
This	  paper	  investigates	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  voluntary	  clawback	  provisions	  as	  a	  
deterrent	  for	  earnings	  management	  behavior.	  The	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  (DF)	  Bill	  signed	  into	  
law	  July	  21,	  2010	  mandates	  that	  the	  SEC	  adopt	  a	  rule	  requiring	  all	  U.S.-­‐listed	  
companies	  to	  implement	  clawback	  provisions	  that	  recapture	  excess	  compensation	  
received	  by	  executives	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  faulty	  financial	  statement	  filing	  with	  the	  SEC	  
that	  later	  must	  be	  restated.	  Implicitly,	  the	  DF	  regulation	  assumes	  that	  clawbacks	  will	  
successfully	  constrain	  financial	  misreporting	  and	  that	  a	  “one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all”	  approach	  
is	  best.	  In	  contrast	  with	  prior	  research	  that	  has	  investigated	  factors	  associated	  with	  
a	  firm’s	  decision	  to	  adopt	  a	  clawback	  provision	  and/or	  various	  capital	  market	  
consequences	  associated	  with	  clawback	  adoptions,	  I	  develop	  a	  stringency	  metric	  for	  
analyzing	  clawback	  structures.	  I	  analyze	  the	  financial	  reporting	  consequences	  
associated	  with	  clawback	  structure	  and	  mediating	  effects	  of	  antecedent	  corporate	  
governance	  quality.	  Results	  indicate	  that,	  for	  both	  weak-­‐governance	  and	  strong-­‐
governance	  firms	  adopting	  clawback	  provisions,	  increased	  clawback	  stringency	  is	  
generally	  associated	  with	  lower	  levels	  of	  earnings	  management.	  However,	  the	  
deterrent	  effect	  of	  clawback	  stringency	  is	  often	  attenuated	  for	  the	  strong-­‐
governance	  firms.	  None	  of	  the	  identified	  adopting	  firms	  had	  duality	  of	  the	  CEO	  and	  
Chairman	  positions,	  thus,	  confirming	  that	  clawback	  adoptions	  may	  be	  
conceptualized	  as	  a	  component	  of	  strong	  governance.	  This	  observation,	  coupled	  
with	  the	  documented	  success	  of	  the	  clawbacks	  in	  deterring	  earnings	  management,	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I. Introduction 
	  
In	  the	  wake	  of	  numerous	  financial	  restatements	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  late	  
1990’s	  and	  early	  2000’s,	  several	  hundred	  firms	  elected	  to	  implement	  clawback	  
provisions—formal	  arrangements	  that	  permit	  the	  recovery	  of	  executive	  
compensation	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  later	  determination	  that	  the	  compensation	  was	  
based	  on	  inaccurate	  financial	  information.	  Typically	  presented	  as	  clauses	  in	  
executive	  compensation	  contracts,	  clawback	  provisions	  explicitly	  communicate	  
adverse	  consequences	  to	  managers	  for	  engaging	  in	  financial	  misreporting	  behavior.	  
The	  structural	  features	  of	  the	  arrangements	  vary	  considerably	  across	  firms,	  with	  
some	  clawbacks	  being	  triggered	  automatically	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  restatement	  and	  
others	  being	  triggered	  only	  at	  the	  board’s	  discretion.	  Among	  other	  features,	  the	  
breadth	  of	  coverage	  of	  executives	  and	  the	  amounts	  of	  compensation	  recovered	  also	  
vary	  widely.	  Perhaps	  more	  important	  than	  the	  recovery	  of	  compensation,	  however,	  
is	  the	  potential	  of	  clawbacks	  to	  deter	  earnings	  management.	  This	  study	  investigates	  
the	  effectiveness	  of	  voluntary	  clawback	  arrangements	  as	  a	  deterrent	  for	  earnings	  
management,1	  taking	  into	  account	  cross-­‐sectional	  variation	  in	  clawback	  structures.	  
Over	  the	  past	  decade,	  regulators	  have	  placed	  heightened	  emphasis	  on	  
clawback	  provisions.	  Section	  304	  of	  the	  Sarbanes-­‐Oxley	  Act	  of	  2002	  (SOX)	  
implemented	  the	  first	  statutory	  clawback	  requirement,	  permitting	  the	  Securities	  
and	  Exchange	  Commission	  (SEC)	  to	  initiate	  firm	  recoveries	  from	  CEOs	  and	  CFOs	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after	  financial	  restatements	  involving	  misconduct.	  	  More	  recently,	  financial	  
institutions	  receiving	  Troubled	  Asset	  Relief	  Program	  (TARP)	  and	  Emergency	  
Economic	  Stabilization	  Act	  (EESA)	  assistance	  were	  required	  to	  adopt	  clawback	  
provisions.	  However,	  unlike	  SOX	  clawbacks,	  TARP	  and	  EESA	  clawbacks	  
automatically	  recover	  compensation	  from	  all	  executives	  that	  is	  based	  on	  any	  
misstatement	  of	  financial	  or	  operating	  information.	  Recently,	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Bill	  
(DF),	  signed	  into	  law	  on	  July	  21,	  2010,	  now	  mandates,	  (in	  Section	  954),	  that	  the	  SEC	  
require	  all	  companies	  listed	  with	  national	  securities	  exchanges	  or	  national	  securities	  
associations	  in	  the	  U.S.	  to	  have	  clawback	  provisions	  that	  require	  the	  recapture	  of	  
compensation.	  Although	  the	  SEC	  has	  not	  yet	  adopted	  a	  final	  rule	  concerning	  
executive	  compensation	  recoveries,	  the	  DF	  Bill	  imposes	  a	  rigid	  clawback	  structure	  
with	  an	  automatic	  trigger	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  financial	  restatement	  due	  to	  material	  
noncompliance	  with	  financial	  reporting	  requirements	  and	  recovery	  of	  excess	  
compensation	  associated	  with	  the	  misstatement.	  
The	  implementation	  of	  clawbacks	  has	  stimulated	  recent	  academic	  research.	  
Several	  recent	  studies	  (Addy,	  Chu,	  and	  Yoder	  (ACY)	  (2011),	  Brown,	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  
Chen	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  and	  Dehaan	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  and	  Gao	  et	  al.	  (2010)) have	  attempted	  to	  
explain	  the	  decision	  to	  adopt	  clawbacks	  based	  on	  firm	  characteristics	  such	  as	  
governance	  and	  prior	  restatements.	  	  Davis-­‐Friday	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  examine	  the	  effects	  
of	  voluntary	  and	  mandatory	  clawback	  adoptions	  on	  firms’	  earnings	  response	  
coefficients,	  and	  Chen	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  and	  Gao	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  examine	  market	  reactions	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voluntary	  clawback	  adoptions	  on	  earnings	  response	  coefficients	  and	  audit	  fees,	  
while	  Dehaan	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  also	  investigate	  the	  impacts	  of	  clawback	  adoptions	  on	  
analysts’	  forecast	  dispersion	  and	  firms’	  ability	  to	  meet	  or	  beat	  analysts’	  forecasts.	  
Gao	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  also	  investigate	  changes	  in	  bid-­‐ask	  spreads	  surrounding	  clawback	  
adoptions.	  Finally,	  Chen	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  demonstrate	  analytically	  that	  clawbacks	  can	  
load	  too	  much	  risk	  on	  managers	  and	  they	  show	  empirically	  that	  clawback	  adoptions	  
are	  associated	  with	  a	  reduction	  in	  discretionary	  accruals	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  pay-­‐to-­‐
performance	  sensitivity.	  	  
Another	  recent	  study	  by	  Chan	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  finds	  reductions	  in	  audit	  report	  
lag,	  firms’	  future	  incidence	  of	  restatements,	  and	  reports	  on	  material	  weaknesses	  in	  
internal	  control	  by	  auditors	  associated	  with	  clawback	  adoptions.	  However,	  these	  
metrics	  hinge	  on	  an	  auditor’s	  performance	  and	  observed	  reductions	  in	  the	  metrics	  
do	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  that	  there	  have	  been	  improvements	  in	  financial	  reporting	  
quality.	  	  
Overall,	  the	  above	  studies	  explore	  various	  consequences	  associated	  with	  
clawback	  adoptions,	  but	  none	  of	  the	  studies	  consider	  the	  possibility	  for	  cross-­‐
sectional	  variation	  in	  the	  structures	  of	  clawbacks,	  apart	  from	  the	  Dehaan	  et	  al.	  
(2012)	  study	  that	  controls	  for	  whether	  provisions	  are	  fraud-­‐based	  or	  performance-­‐
based.2	  However,	  their	  classification	  scheme	  only	  distinguishes	  among	  clawback	  
provisions	  based	  on	  whether	  personal	  engagement	  in	  fraud	  or	  misconduct	  is	  
necessary	  to	  trigger	  a	  clawback	  or	  whether	  a	  clawback	  can	  extract	  recoveries	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Fraud-­‐based	  clawbacks	  are	  only	  triggered	  where	  an	  executive	  has	  committed	  or	  misconduct,	  
causing	  a	  misstatement.	  Performance-­‐based	  clawbacks	  can	  recover	  compensation	  from	  all	  executives	  




	   4	  
irrespective	  of	  personal	  culpability.	  Dehaan	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  do	  not	  consider	  whether	  a	  
board	  is	  obligated	  to	  pursue	  a	  recovery	  or	  can	  do	  so	  at	  its	  own	  will,	  nor	  do	  they	  
consider	  specific	  triggering	  events,	  amounts	  of	  clawbacks,	  materiality	  thresholds,	  or	  
executive	  coverage	  that	  may	  be	  imposed	  by	  boards.	  However,	  such	  structural	  
variation	  in	  clawback	  parameters	  can	  impact	  the	  potential	  effectiveness	  of	  
clawbacks.	  Although	  the	  study	  at	  hand	  also	  investigates	  financial	  reporting	  
consequences	  of	  clawbacks,	  an	  important	  distinguishing	  feature	  is	  the	  development	  
of	  a	  stringency	  measure	  that	  is	  based	  on	  a	  detailed	  consideration	  of	  clawback	  
structural	  features	  when	  analyzing	  the	  effects	  of	  clawbacks.	  An	  additional	  key	  
distinction	  between	  my	  study	  and	  others	  is	  the	  consideration	  of	  governance	  as	  a	  
potential	  mediator	  of	  clawback	  effectiveness.	  None	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  studies	  
control	  for	  governance	  when	  estimating	  the	  effects	  of	  clawbacks,	  nor	  do	  they	  
consider	  the	  possibility	  for	  governance	  to	  strengthen	  or	  attenuate	  the	  deterrence	  
effectiveness	  of	  clawbacks.	  
Many	  previous	  studies	  have	  found	  that	  governance	  is	  associated	  with	  
enhanced	  earnings	  quality	  and	  or	  earnings	  response	  coefficients	  (Beasley	  (1996),	  
Uzun	  et	  al.	  (2004),	  Klein	  (2002),	  Bédard	  et	  al.	  (2004),	  Dechow	  et	  al.	  (1996),	  and	  
Carcello	  and	  Nagy	  (2004)).	  Therefore,	  since	  clawback	  provisions	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  
component	  of	  governance,	  clawbacks	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  reduce	  earnings	  
management	  activity,	  as	  they	  help	  to	  foster	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  financial	  
misreporting	  is	  discouraged.	  Meanwhile,	  it	  would	  be	  surprising	  if	  their	  effectiveness	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The	  perceived	  credibility	  of	  clawbacks	  may	  be	  enhanced	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  strong	  
pre-­‐existing	  governance	  and	  diminished	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  weak	  governance.	  	  
A	  factor	  distinguishing	  clawbacks	  from	  other	  governance	  components,	  
however,	  is	  that	  clawbacks	  transfer	  a	  component	  of	  financial	  reporting	  risk	  from	  the	  
firm	  to	  the	  manager,	  thus,	  forcing	  managers	  to	  more	  directly	  bear	  the	  risks	  
associated	  with	  their	  actions.	  	  Levine	  and	  Smith	  (LS)	  (2010)	  demonstrate	  
analytically	  that,	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  imposition	  of	  clawback	  compensation	  risk	  on	  
managers	  may	  diminish	  managerial	  effort	  and	  actually	  be	  detrimental	  to	  
shareholders.	  	  
In	  the	  present	  study,	  I	  fill	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  by:	  1)	  developing	  a	  novel	  
measure,	  “stringency”	  to	  characterize	  the	  structures	  of	  clawback	  provisions	  and	  
summarize	  their	  ex	  ante	  deterrence	  potential,	  2)	  analyzing	  the	  impact	  of	  clawback	  
stringency,	  conditional	  on	  antecedent	  corporate	  governance	  quality,	  on	  firms’	  
subsequent	  financial	  reporting	  behavior,	  specifically	  their	  income-­‐increasing	  
earnings	  management	  activity,	  after	  controlling	  for	  economic	  incentives	  to	  manage	  
earnings,	  3)	  examining	  how	  antecedent	  corporate	  governance	  quality	  impacts	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  clawback	  stringency,	  and	  4)	  investigating	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  
systematic	  relation	  between	  corporate	  governance	  quality	  and	  clawback	  structure.	  
The	  aforementioned	  prior	  studies	  examine	  the	  determinants	  and	  capital	  market	  
perceptions	  of	  the	  adoption	  decision,	  but	  do	  not	  examine	  the	  determinants	  or	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contribution	  of	  my	  study	  is	  the	  new	  stringency	  measure	  that	  I	  develop	  to	  
characterize	  the	  structural	  features	  of	  clawbacks	  when	  estimating	  their	  effects.	  	  
The	  results	  generally	  indicate	  that	  increased	  clawback	  stringency	  is	  generally	  
associated	  with	  lower	  earnings	  management	  for	  both	  low	  and	  high-­‐governance	  
firms,	  consistent	  with	  H1.	  However,	  an	  important	  finding	  in	  several	  of	  the	  analyses	  
is	  that	  the	  deterrent	  effect	  of	  clawback	  stringency	  is	  attenuated	  for	  firms	  with	  high	  
antecedent	  corporate	  governance	  quality,	  consistent	  with	  H2.	  Although	  these	  results	  
provide	  support	  for	  the	  potential	  deterrence	  benefits	  of	  DF,	  they	  also	  indicate	  that	  
DF	  clawbacks	  cannot	  be	  expected	  to	  exert	  a	  uniform	  deterrent	  effect.	  
Additional	  results	  indicate	  that	  a	  firm’s	  decision	  to	  implement	  a	  particular	  
clawback	  structure	  is	  not	  random,	  but	  depends	  on	  firm	  characteristics.	  Specifically,	  
capital	  intensity	  is	  negatively	  associated	  with	  clawback	  stringency	  and	  industry-­‐
average	  R&D-­‐to-­‐sales	  is	  positively	  associated	  with	  stringency.	  Apart	  from	  these	  
factors,	  however,	  conditional	  on	  clawback	  adoption,	  the	  stringency	  decision	  appears	  
to	  be	  largely	  idiosyncratic	  and	  not	  systematically	  related	  to	  a	  firm’s	  antecedent	  
corporate	  governance	  quality.	  Key	  findings	  are	  that	  none	  of	  the	  clawback	  firms	  had	  
duality	  of	  the	  CEO	  and	  Chairman	  positions	  in	  the	  year	  of	  clawback	  adoption	  or	  the	  
year	  prior,	  and	  none	  of	  the	  186	  adopting	  firms	  that	  had	  prerequisite	  data	  available	  
for	  the	  stringency	  determinants	  model	  had	  experienced	  recent3	  frauds	  or	  
restatements.	  Importantly,	  these	  results	  strongly	  indicate	  that	  only	  firms	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  A	  recent	  fraud	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  fraud	  that	  resulted	  in	  an	  issuance	  of	  an	  Accounting	  and	  Auditing	  
Enforcement	  Release,	  (AAER),	  by	  the	  SEC	  during	  or	  after	  1998	  and	  prior	  to	  2007.	  Recent	  
restatements	  are	  defined	  as	  SEC	  financial	  restatements	  that	  were	  listed	  in	  the	  Government	  
Accounting	  Office	  (GAO)	  databases,	  which	  contain	  restatement	  announcements	  made	  between	  1999	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strong	  governance	  adopted	  clawbacks,	  therefore	  supporting	  a	  need	  for	  regulation	  
such	  as	  that	  proposed	  by	  DF,	  since	  the	  firms	  that,	  perhaps,	  need	  the	  clawbacks	  most,	  
are	  not	  adopting	  voluntarily.4	  	  
A	  final	  contribution	  of	  the	  study	  at	  hand	  is	  the	  potential	  to	  find	  that	  
alternative	  clawback	  structures	  are	  more	  effective	  than	  the	  “one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all”	  
proposed	  DF	  structure.	  The	  structures	  of	  voluntary	  clawback	  provisions	  are	  rich	  
with	  variation,	  with	  some	  being	  even	  more	  stringent	  than	  the	  proposed	  DF	  
structure.	  Among	  the	  286	  voluntary	  clawback	  firms	  identified,	  65	  firms	  
implemented	  clawbacks	  that	  were	  at	  least	  as	  stringent	  as	  that	  proposed	  by	  DF,	  and	  
34	  firms	  adopted	  even	  more	  stringent	  clawbacks.	  The	  SEC	  is	  currently	  seeking	  
public	  commentary	  and	  plans	  to	  issue	  a	  final	  rule	  during	  2012.	  (SEC,	  2011).	  
Therefore,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  insights	  of	  my	  proposed	  research	  can	  be	  useful	  to	  the	  
SEC	  as	  it	  deliberates	  over	  a	  final	  rule	  to	  implement	  the	  requirements	  of	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  
and	  also	  to	  members	  of	  Congress	  as	  they	  contemplate	  a	  repeal	  of	  DF	  after	  the	  2012	  
election.	  	  
The	  remainder	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  Section	  II	  contains	  
background	  information	  about	  clawbacks	  and	  their	  characteristics.	  Section	  III	  
presents	  a	  discussion	  of	  prior	  literature	  and	  research	  hypothesis	  development.	  
Section	  IV	  presents	  the	  methodology	  and	  empirical	  estimation	  models.	  Section	  V	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Prior	  to	  DF,	  firms	  could	  elect	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  adopt	  clawback	  provisions	  unless	  they	  received	  
TARP	  or	  EESA	  funds.	  DF	  clawbacks	  apply	  to	  all	  executives	  of	  U.S.-­‐listed	  companies,	  and	  similar	  to	  
TARP/EESA	  clawbacks,	  they	  are	  automatically	  triggered	  by	  a	  financial	  restatement.	  However,	  DF	  
clawbacks	  are	  more	  restrictive	  than	  TARP/EESA	  clawbacks,	  as	  they	  apply	  only	  to	  financial	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describes	  the	  sample	  selection	  and	  measurement	  of	  variables.	  Section	  VI	  discusses	  
the	  results	  from	  the	  empirical	  analyses	  and	  Section	  VII	  presents	  the	  conclusions.	  
	  
II.	  Clawback	  Characteristics	  and	  Regulatory	  Background	  
Defining	  Features	  of	  Clawback	  Provisions	  
An	  example	  of	  a	  clawback	  provision	  adopted	  voluntarily	  by	  The	  Gap,	  Inc.	  on	  
February	  14,	  2007	  is	  excerpted	  from	  The	  Gap,	  Inc.’s	  2008	  10-­‐Q	  filing	  with	  the	  SEC	  
and	  presented	  below:	  
Recoupment Policy. On February 14, 2007, the Board of Directors ("Board") adopted 
a recoupment policy as described in this paragraph…To the extent permitted by 
governing law, in all appropriate cases as determined by the Board, require 
reimbursement and/or cancellation of any bonus or other incentive compensation, 
including stock-based compensation, awarded to an executive officer or other member of 
the Company's executive leadership team where all of the following factors are present: 
(a) the award was predicated upon the achievement of certain financial results that were 
subsequently the subject of a restatement, (b) in the Board's view, the executive engaged 
in fraud or intentional misconduct that was a substantial contributing cause to the need 
for the restatement, and (c) a lower award would have been made to the executive based 
upon the restated financial results. In each such instance, the Company will seek to 
recover the individual executive's entire annual bonus or award for the relevant period, 
plus a reasonable rate of interest. [Exhibit 10 – Material Contracts section of The	  Gap,	  
Inc.’s	  December 9, 2008 Form 10-Q filing with the SEC] 
	  
Several	  features	  of	  The	  Gap,	  Inc.	  clawback	  are	  noteworthy.	  First,	  the	  policy	  
grants	  discretion	  to	  The	  Gap,	  Inc.’s	  board	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  will	  pursue	  
a	  clawback.	  In	  contrast	  with	  the	  proposed	  DF	  clawback	  structure	  and	  the	  provisions	  
of	  other	  firms,	  the	  clawback	  is	  not	  self-­‐executing,	  but	  is	  initiated	  at	  the	  election	  of	  
the	  board.	  The	  wording	  “in	  all	  appropriate	  cases	  as	  determined	  by	  the	  Board”	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compensation	  under	  the	  provision.	  The	  Gap,	  Inc.’s	  provision	  is	  only	  triggered	  if	  
there	  is	  a	  financial	  restatement	  and	  the	  board	  concludes	  that	  an	  executive	  
personally	  and	  intentionally	  engaged	  in	  wrongful	  acts	  contributing	  to	  the	  
misstatement.	  Thus,	  in	  addition	  to	  giving	  the	  board	  overall	  discretion	  to	  impose	  a	  
clawback	  as	  it	  deems	  appropriate,	  The	  Gap,	  Inc.	  also	  embeds	  discretion	  in	  its	  policy	  
by	  calling	  upon	  the	  board	  to	  make	  judgments	  about	  individuals’	  conduct	  and	  the	  
extent	  of	  their	  personal	  involvement	  in	  a	  misstatement.	  The	  Gap,	  Inc.	  clawback	  
policy	  applies	  to	  all	  executive	  officers	  and	  provides	  for	  the	  recovery	  of	  the	  entire	  
bonus	  or	  incentive	  compensation	  granted	  to	  the	  executives	  during	  the	  period	  of	  a	  
misstatement,	  plus	  interest.	  Some	  firms	  only	  cover	  a	  sub-­‐set	  of	  executives	  in	  their	  
clawback	  policies	  and	  only	  recover	  excess	  bonus	  or	  incentive	  compensation.	  Thus,	  
The	  Gap,	  Inc.	  takes	  a	  more	  stringent	  (and	  punitive)	  stance	  along	  these	  lines.	  
Clawback	  provisions	  may	  appear	  in	  a	  firm’s	  corporate	  charter	  or	  bylaws,	  but	  
are	  typically	  presented	  as	  clauses	  in	  executive	  employment	  contracts	  like	  the	  one	  
quoted	  above.	  Since	  the	  potential	  effects	  of	  clawback	  provisions	  depend	  on	  their	  
features	  -­‐	  that	  can	  vary	  widely	  -­‐	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  identify	  the	  key	  characteristics	  of	  
clawbacks.	  Based	  on	  my	  review	  of	  clawback	  descriptions	  provided	  in	  annual	  reports	  
and	  proxy	  statement	  filings	  with	  the	  SEC,	  I	  have	  identified	  seven	  major	  
characteristics:	  (1)	  triggering	  conditions,	  (2)	  clawback	  amounts,	  (3)	  pay	  types	  
covered,	  (4)	  individuals	  covered,	  (5)	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  period	  from	  which	  
compensation	  may	  be	  recaptured,	  (6)	  the	  allowance	  for	  a	  reverse	  clawback,	  and	  (7)	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initiation.	  Table	  1,	  which	  appears	  in	  the	  Appendix,	  summarizes	  the	  major	  features	  of	  
clawback	  provisions.	  (All	  tables	  are	  presented	  in	  the	  Appendix.)	  
<Insert	  Table	  1	  about	  here.>	   	  
The	  triggering	  conditions	  are	  arguably	  the	  most	  important	  structural	  feature	  
because	  they	  specify	  when	  a	  clawback	  can	  occur	  and	  the	  remaining	  characteristics	  
are	  only	  applicable	  in	  the	  event	  that	  a	  clawback	  takes	  place.	  The	  triggering	  
conditions	  for	  clawbacks	  may	  be	  classified	  as:	  (1)	  events,	  (2)	  behaviors,	  and	  (3)	  
personal	  responsibility	  requirements,	  and	  the	  latter	  two	  conditions	  may	  be	  
regarded	  as	  “sub-­‐triggers”.	  Typical	  triggering	  events	  are	  financial	  restatements,	  
financial	  misstatements	  (i.e.	  misstatements	  that	  are	  below	  the	  SEC	  materiality	  
threshold	  requiring	  a	  restatement),	  or	  the	  use	  of	  inaccurate	  operating	  metrics	  in	  the	  
calculation	  of	  awards.	  Clawbacks	  under	  DF	  are	  triggered	  by	  a	  financial	  restatement,	  
but	  boards	  can	  apply	  more	  stringent	  triggers	  that	  expand	  the	  scope	  of	  misstated	  
information	  or	  lessen	  the	  materiality	  threshold	  that	  will	  trigger	  a	  clawback.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  having	  triggering	  events,	  clawback	  policies	  may	  also	  
incorporate	  two	  types	  of	  sub-­‐triggers	  that	  restrict	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  a	  
clawback	  may	  be	  imposed—behavioral	  triggers	  and	  personal	  responsibility	  
requirements.	  Behavioral	  triggers	  restrict	  the	  application	  of	  clawbacks	  to	  instances	  
in	  which	  a	  specific	  behavior	  was	  present	  in	  one	  or	  more	  executives.	  A	  triggering	  
behavior	  may	  be	  either	  an	  intentional	  bad	  behavior,	  (i.e.	  fraud	  or	  misconduct),	  or	  an	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Personal	  responsibility	  requirements	  may	  further	  restrict	  the	  application	  of	  
clawbacks.	  Some	  provisions	  (such	  as	  The	  Gap,	  Inc.’s)	  only	  subject	  an	  individual	  to	  a	  
clawback	  if	  s/he	  is	  personally	  responsible	  for	  or	  directly	  involved	  in	  a	  triggering	  
event	  through	  his	  or	  her	  own	  conduct.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  personal	  responsibility	  
requirement,	  a	  behavior	  committed	  by	  one	  executive	  can	  trigger	  a	  clawback	  for	  all	  
executives.	  Behavioral	  triggers	  and	  personal	  responsibility	  requirements	  add	  layers	  
of	  discretion	  to	  the	  triggering	  conditions.	  In	  contrast,	  DF	  imposes	  neither	  a	  
behavioral	  trigger	  nor	  a	  personal	  responsibility	  requirement	  and	  provides	  for	  
automatic	  recovery	  after	  a	  financial	  restatement,	  thus,	  implicitly	  removing	  board	  
discretion	  from	  the	  triggering	  conditions	  and	  obligating	  boards	  to	  pursue	  
recoveries.	  
Voluntary	  clawback	  provisions	  are	  not	  uniform	  in	  the	  amounts	  of	  pay	  that	  
they	  seek	  to	  recover.	  Recoveries	  range	  from	  excess	  bonus	  or	  excess	  incentive	  pay	  to	  
the	  entirety	  of	  the	  combined	  bonus	  and	  incentive	  pay,	  plus	  interest.	  DF	  recovers	  
excess	  pay	  of	  both	  types,	  but	  firms	  can	  specify	  a	  larger,	  more	  stringent	  recovery	  
amount.	  Most	  clawback	  provisions	  cover	  all	  types	  of	  bonus	  or	  incentive	  pay,	  
consistent	  with	  DF.5	  The	  most	  stringent	  voluntary	  agreements	  include	  all	  
participants	  in	  the	  bonus/incentive	  compensation	  programs,	  (similar	  to	  DF),	  
whereas	  some	  voluntary	  agreements	  only	  make	  recoveries	  from	  a	  sub-­‐set	  of	  
executives	  such	  as	  the	  CEO	  and/or	  CFO.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  For	  instance,	  the	  provisions	  may	  potentially	  cover	  only	  a	  sub-­‐set	  of	  pay,	  such	  as	  the	  cash	  bonus	  but	  
not	  options	  or	  equity-­‐based	  compensation.	  However,	  in	  an	  earlier	  preliminary	  sample	  of	  70	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The	  duration	  of	  the	  period	  from	  which	  a	  clawback	  arrangement	  can	  extract	  
compensation	  also	  differs	  substantially	  across	  firms.	  The	  length	  of	  this	  period	  is	  
commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “look-­‐back”	  period.6	  While	  some	  firms	  specify	  a	  period	  
such	  as	  three	  years	  (the	  same	  as	  the	  DF	  requirement),	  many	  firms	  do	  not	  explicitly	  
state	  a	  period	  or	  attempt	  to	  claim	  indefinitely	  long	  periods.7	  Longer	  periods	  make	  a	  
policy	  more	  stringent.	  Finally,	  most	  clawback	  provisions	  are	  asymmetric,	  only	  
allowing	  for	  a	  recovery	  to	  be	  made	  by	  the	  firm	  from	  the	  executive.8	  	  
Overall,	  many	  voluntary	  clawback	  structures	  embed	  substantial	  discretion,	  
allowing	  boards	  or	  compensation	  committees	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  will	  
seek	  recoveries,	  the	  individuals	  from	  whom	  they	  will	  seek	  recoveries,	  and	  the	  
amounts	  of	  any	  recoveries.	  While	  discretion	  permits	  tailoring	  of	  clawback	  outcomes	  
to	  individual	  circumstances,	  it	  can	  also	  serve	  to	  reduce	  the	  likelihood	  that	  clawbacks	  
will	  be	  actually	  enforced	  by	  providing	  “wiggle	  room”	  for	  boards	  and	  compensation	  
committees	  to	  prevent	  the	  initiation	  of	  a	  clawback	  or	  reduce	  its	  severity.	  Less	  
independent	  boards	  with	  members	  who	  could	  be	  directly	  impacted	  by	  clawbacks	  
might	  have	  incentives	  to	  abuse	  this	  discretion,	  especially	  in	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  a	  
duality	  of	  the	  CEO	  and	  board	  chairperson	  positions.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The	  look-­‐back	  period	  is	  the	  length	  of	  time	  a	  company	  will	  look	  backwards	  in	  time	  from	  a	  specified	  
date,	  such	  as	  the	  date	  that	  a	  company	  determines	  that	  it	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  prepare	  a	  restatement,	  
for	  purposes	  of	  computing	  the	  recovery	  amount.	  Some	  firms	  instead	  state	  the	  recovery	  period	  as	  a	  
given	  number	  of	  years	  from	  which	  compensation	  will	  be	  subject	  to	  recoupment	  after	  related	  financial	  
statements	  are	  filed	  with	  the	  SEC.	  
7	  In	  the	  event	  that	  legal	  action	  is	  taken	  to	  initiate	  a	  compensation	  recovery,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  
statute	  of	  limitations	  in	  a	  particular	  state	  may	  not	  permit	  the	  actual	  application	  of	  a	  limitless	  look-­‐
back	  period.	  
8	  However,	  a	  small	  percentage	  of	  firms	  actually	  provide	  for	  a	  reverse	  clawback—the	  executive	  can	  
recover	  from	  the	  firm	  if	  it	  is	  later	  determined	  that	  he/she	  would	  have	  been	  entitled	  to	  a	  larger	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Two	  conclusions	  emerge	  from	  this	  discussion	  of	  clawback	  structure.	  First,	  
the	  ability	  of	  clawbacks	  to	  deter	  financial	  misreporting	  is	  likely	  to	  depend	  on	  their	  
structure	  (i.e.,	  underlying	  provisions).	  Second,	  as	  clawback	  provisions	  vary	  
substantially	  among	  firms,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  control	  for	  their	  structure	  when	  
analyzing	  ex	  post	  financial	  reporting	  consequences	  associated	  with	  their	  
implementation.	  	  
	  
III.	  Theory	  and	  Hypotheses	  
Clawbacks	  and	  Deterrence	  Theory	  
To	  the	  extent	  that	  financial	  misstatements	  are	  intentional,	  the	  insights	  of	  
deterrence	  theory	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  this	  setting.	  Gibbs	  (1975)	  argues	  that	  successful	  
deterrents	  have	  three	  components:	  certainty,	  severity,	  and	  celerity.	  Certainty	  can	  be	  
defined	  as	  a	  joint	  probability	  of	  detection	  and	  receipt	  of	  punishment.	  Severity	  
captures	  the	  magnitude	  of	  a	  punishment	  and	  celerity	  is	  the	  quickness	  with	  which	  a	  
punishment	  is	  received.	  According	  to	  deterrence	  theory,	  the	  most	  successful	  
deterrents	  are	  high	  in	  all	  three	  of	  these	  attributes.	  In	  theory,	  clawback	  provisions	  
raise	  the	  level	  of	  each	  of	  these	  three	  attributes.	  The	  presence	  of	  a	  legally	  binding	  
agreement	  improves	  a	  firm’s	  ability	  to	  recover	  from	  an	  executive	  under	  law,	  
increasing	  the	  certainty	  of	  punishment	  relative	  to	  a	  no-­‐clawback	  scenario.	  The	  
legally	  binding	  agreement	  can	  also	  increase	  the	  amount	  (severity)	  of	  the	  
punishment	  that	  might	  be	  recovered	  under	  law	  and	  may	  reduce	  the	  legal	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deterrence	  theory	  would	  suggest	  that	  properly	  designed	  clawbacks	  should	  serve	  as	  
a	  deterrent	  from	  aggressive	  financial	  reporting,	  reducing	  earnings	  management	  
activity.	  However,	  all	  clawback	  provisions	  are	  not	  equal.	  Many	  clawback	  provisions	  
afford	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  board	  to	  forego	  the	  opportunity	  to	  recover	  
compensation,	  while	  others	  are	  more	  stringent,	  being	  triggered	  automatically	  after	  a	  
restatement	  and	  requiring	  that	  executives	  forfeit	  all	  compensation	  associated	  with	  
the	  restatement,	  (consistent	  with	  the	  proposed	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  requirements).	  I	  have	  
developed	  a	  stringency	  measure	  to	  summarize	  the	  ex	  ante	  deterrence	  potential	  of	  
clawbacks.	  A	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  my	  stringency	  metric	  is	  deferred	  to	  Section	  V.	  
Ceteris	  paribus,	  deterrence	  theory	  unambiguously	  suggests	  that	  the	  implementation	  
of	  a	  more	  stringent	  clawback	  provision	  should	  be	  at	  least	  weakly	  associated	  with	  a	  
lower	  level	  of	  income-­‐increasing	  earnings	  management.	  However,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  
a	  firm’s	  antecedent	  corporate	  governance	  impacts	  the	  credibility	  of	  a	  clawback,	  
there	  may	  be	  differences	  in	  the	  effect	  size	  of	  stringency,	  based	  on	  governance.	  
Allowing	  for	  this	  possibility,	  I	  estimate	  the	  effects	  of	  stringency	  conditional	  on	  the	  
quality	  of	  a	  firm’s	  pre-­‐existing	  governance.	  Deterrence	  theory	  would	  support	  the	  
following	  hypothesis:	  
H1:	  For	  firms	  of	  both	  low	  and	  high	  corporate	  governance	  quality,	  increased	  
clawback	  stringency	  will	  be	  associated	  with	  lower	  levels	  of	  income-­‐
increasing	  earnings	  management	  activity.	  
	  
Optimal	  Contracting	  Theory	  and	  Clawback	  Provisions	  
Despite	  the	  potential	  deterrence	  of	  earnings	  management	  benefits	  provided	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may	  not	  always	  be	  optimal	  in	  contracting	  and	  that	  their	  optimality	  depends	  on	  
underlying	  firm	  characteristics.	  Levine	  and	  Smith	  (LS)	  (2010)	  analytically	  model	  the	  
usage	  of	  performance	  clawback	  provisions	  in	  a	  two-­‐period	  setting	  in	  which	  a	  
manager	  exerts	  an	  effort	  in	  the	  first	  period	  that	  culminates	  in	  a	  stochastic	  signal	  
during	  the	  first	  period	  and	  a	  cash	  flow	  realization	  in	  the	  second	  period.	  	  The	  first-­‐
period	  signal	  and	  the	  second-­‐period	  cash	  flow	  imperfectly	  convey	  manager	  effort,	  
and	  the	  agent	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  distort	  the	  signal.	  LS	  (2010)	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  
optimality	  of	  a	  clawback	  versus	  no-­‐clawback	  contract	  depends	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  the	  
following	  characteristics	  of	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  environment:	  (1)	  the	  degree	  of	  noise	  
in	  cash	  flow	  realizations,	  (2)	  the	  ease	  of	  earnings	  management	  activity,	  and	  (3)	  the	  
magnitude	  of	  agent	  impatience.	  Specifically,	  LS	  (2010)	  find	  that	  when	  levels	  of	  these	  
attributes	  are	  high,	  a	  no-­‐clawback	  contract	  is	  optimal.	  Important	  implications	  of	  
these	  finding	  are	  that	  clawback	  provisions	  are	  not	  unilaterally	  optimal	  for	  all	  firms	  
and	  that	  the	  optimality	  of	  a	  clawback	  provision	  may	  depend	  on	  characteristics	  of	  a	  
firm’s	  operating	  environment.	  These	  contracting	  factors	  may	  counteract	  the	  
deterrent	  effect,	  thus,	  possibly	  resulting	  in	  a	  rejection	  of	  H1.	  Accordingly,	  I	  examine	  
another	  related	  factor	  that	  might	  influence	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  clawback	  
provisions—the	  quality	  of	  a	  firm’s	  pre-­‐existing	  corporate	  governance.	  
	  
Interdependence	  Between	  Clawback	  Stringency	  and	  Corporate	  Governance	  
Prior	  research	  indicates	  that	  well-­‐governed	  firms	  tend	  to	  engage	  in	  less	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using	  matched-­‐pair	  designs,	  both	  document	  a	  negative	  association	  between	  the	  
percentage	  of	  outside	  directors	  on	  a	  board	  and	  the	  likelihood	  of	  accounting	  fraud,	  
and	  Klein	  (2002)	  finds	  a	  negative	  relation	  between	  the	  percentage	  of	  outside	  
directors	  and	  abnormal	  accruals.	  Similarly,	  Bédard	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  find	  that	  abnormal	  
accruals	  are	  lower	  for	  firms	  with	  wholly	  independent	  audit	  committees.	  Dechow	  et	  
al.	  (1996)	  and	  Carcello	  and	  Nagy	  (2004)	  document	  positive	  associations	  between	  
fraud	  and	  earnings	  manipulations,	  respectively,	  and	  duality	  of	  the	  CEO	  and	  board	  
chair	  positions.	  Thus,	  some	  empirical	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  financial	  reporting	  
quality	  is	  positively	  associated	  with	  corporate	  governance	  quality.	  	  
A	  firm’s	  ex	  ante	  level	  of	  earnings	  management	  will	  determine	  the	  maximum	  
potential	  improvement	  in	  financial	  reporting	  quality	  that	  can	  be	  made	  from	  adding	  a	  
clawback.	  Thus,	  firms	  with	  strong	  governance	  are	  likely	  to	  experience,	  at	  best,	  only	  a	  
modest	  reduction	  in	  their	  earnings	  management	  activity	  from	  adding	  a	  stringent	  
clawback	  provision.	  Consistent	  with	  this	  expectation,	  economic	  theory	  of	  
diminishing	  marginal	  returns	  would	  also	  suggest	  that	  the	  marginal	  benefit	  of	  adding	  
a	  clawback	  provision—an	  additional	  corporate	  governance	  feature—or	  increasing	  
the	  stringency	  of	  a	  clawback	  provision	  should	  diminish	  with	  a	  firm’s	  pre-­‐existing	  
corporate	  governance	  quality.	  Therefore,	  ceteris	  paribus,	  clawback	  stringency	  
should	  have	  a	  smaller	  marginal	  impact	  on	  income-­‐increasing	  earnings	  management	  
for	  firms	  with	  strong	  governance	  relative	  to	  firms	  with	  weak	  governance.	  Thus,	  my	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H2:	  The	  impact	  of	  clawback	  stringency	  on	  firms’	  levels	  of	  income-­‐increasing	  
earnings	  management	  will	  be	  attenuated	  as	  antecedent	  corporate	  
governance	  quality	  increases.	  
	  
Antecedent	  Corporate	  Governance	  Quality	  and	  Clawback	  Credibility	  
However,	  a	  factor	  that	  could	  counteract	  H2	  is	  that	  if	  firms	  with	  weak	  
governance	  tend	  to	  implement	  clawbacks	  that	  lack	  stringency,	  then	  clawbacks	  may	  
not	  alter	  management’s	  incentives	  to	  manipulate	  earnings	  (as	  predicted	  by	  H1	  and	  
H2.)	  (I	  investigate	  this	  possibility	  in	  H3.)	  
Furthermore,	  even	  if	  weakly	  governed	  firms	  were	  to	  implement	  stringent	  
clawback	  provisions,	  there	  could	  be	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  actual	  willingness	  of	  
weak	  boards	  to	  enforce	  the	  clawback	  provisions	  ex	  post.	  	  A	  common	  characteristic	  
of	  many	  firms	  with	  weak	  governance	  is	  that	  the	  CEO	  also	  serves	  as	  Board	  
Chairperson.	  Under	  such	  circumstances,	  I	  conjecture	  that	  it	  would	  be	  more	  difficult	  
for	  a	  weak	  Board	  to	  enforce	  the	  clawback.	  In	  either	  of	  these	  situations,	  the	  adoption	  
of	  clawbacks	  may	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  earnings	  management	  incentives	  at	  
firms	  having	  weak	  governance.	  Meanwhile,	  managers	  of	  firms	  with	  strong	  
governance	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  engage	  in	  little	  or	  no	  earnings	  management	  before	  
clawback	  adoption.	  Thus,	  clawbacks	  may	  have	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  earnings	  
management	  of	  well-­‐governed	  firms,	  and	  therefore,	  the	  effect	  of	  stringency,	  (if	  one	  
exists),	  may	  not	  differ	  across	  antecedent	  governance	  quality	  levels.	  
Association	  between	  Clawback	  Stringency	  and	  Corporate	  Governance	  
Clawbacks	  might	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  deterrent	  effect	  if	  weakly	  governed	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association	  exists	  between	  clawback	  stringency	  and	  corporate	  governance	  quality.	  
To	  the	  extent	  that	  clawback	  stringency	  is	  correlated	  with	  corporate	  governance	  or	  
other	  firm	  attributes,	  that	  can	  also	  significantly	  influence	  a	  firm’s	  earnings	  
management,	  a	  standard	  OLS	  regression	  could	  produce	  biased	  estimates	  of	  the	  
effects	  of	  stringency,	  incorrectly	  associating	  with	  clawbacks	  a	  reduction	  in	  earnings	  
management	  activity	  that	  is	  really	  driven	  by	  concurrent	  firm	  characteristics	  or	  
decisions.	  Therefore,	  if	  there	  is	  a	  systematic	  relation	  between	  firm	  attributes	  and	  
stringency,	  it	  will	  be	  important	  to	  control	  for	  self-­‐selection	  when	  attempting	  to	  
estimate	  the	  effects	  of	  stringency.	  	  
Several	  papers	  strongly	  suggest	  that	  clawback	  adoptions	  are	  related	  to	  
various	  governance	  and	  firm	  characteristics.	  	  ACY	  (2011)	  examine	  a	  sample	  of	  
clawback	  adoptions	  between	  2006	  and	  2008	  and	  provide	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  
clawback	  adoptions	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  the	  presence	  of:	  (1)	  stronger	  independent	  
monitoring	  over	  management	  as	  measured	  by	  an	  index	  of	  management	  influence,	  
(2)	  interlocks	  in	  directorships	  with	  firms	  who	  have	  already	  adopted	  a	  clawback	  
provision,	  (3)	  past	  firm	  restatements,	  and	  (4)	  a	  duality	  of	  the	  roles	  of	  CEO	  and	  board	  
chair,	  but	  less	  prevalent	  where	  there	  is	  (5)	  increased	  information	  risk	  in	  the	  
accounting	  system.9	  Surprisingly,	  they	  find	  no	  evidence	  that	  either	  materiality	  of	  the	  
bonus	  relative	  to	  a	  firm’s	  net	  income	  or	  any	  employed	  measure	  of	  accounting	  
conservatism	  affects	  a	  firm’s	  likelihood	  of	  adoption.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  They	  measure	  information	  risk	  in	  the	  accounting	  system	  by	  changes	  in	  “long-­‐term	  non-­‐cash	  net	  
operating	  assets”	  consistent	  with	  the	  definitions	  employed	  by	  Dechow,	  Ge,	  Larson,	  and	  Sloan	  (2007)	  
and	  Richardson,	  Sloan,	  Soliman,	  and	  Tuna	  (2005).	  They	  gather	  data	  on	  duality	  of	  the	  CEO	  and	  
Chairman	  positions	  from	  proxy	  statements	  in	  2007	  for	  non-­‐adopters,	  and	  the	  year	  of	  clawback	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In	  a	  concurrent	  study,	  Brown	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  find	  that	  firm	  size,	  past	  history	  
with	  restatement,	  mergers	  &	  acquisitions	  bonuses,	  and	  goodwill	  impairments	  all	  
increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  voluntary	  adoption	  and	  that	  CEO	  influence	  diminishes	  it.	  
Although	  not	  the	  primary	  emphasis	  of	  their	  capital	  market	  reaction	  study,	  Gao	  et	  al.	  
(2011)	  also	  present	  evidence	  that	  greater	  CEO	  influence	  (measured	  by	  turnover	  and	  
tenure)	  reduces	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  clawback	  adoption	  and	  that	  past	  history	  with	  
restatement	  encourages	  adoption.	  	  
Overall,	  these	  studies	  suggest	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  clawback	  provisions,	  like	  
other	  governance	  components,	  results	  from	  a	  self-­‐selection	  process.	  I	  now	  examine	  
determinants	  of	  clawback	  stringency	  and	  investigate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  adopting	  
firms	  self-­‐select	  into	  clawback	  structures	  based	  on	  governance	  or	  other	  firm	  
characteristics.	  Specifically,	  I	  test	  for	  associations	  between	  corporate	  governance	  or	  
other	  firm	  characteristics	  and	  clawback	  stringency,	  conditional	  on	  clawback	  
adoption.	  The	  possibility	  of	  idiosyncratic	  clawback	  structures	  notwithstanding,	  I	  
strongly	  expect	  a	  positive	  relation	  between	  clawback	  stringency	  and	  governance	  
quality10	  since	  clawback	  provisions	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  component	  of	  a	  firm’s	  
corporate	  governance	  and	  there	  are	  several	  studies	  that	  find	  that	  stronger	  
corporate	  governance	  is	  associated	  with	  an	  increased	  likelihood	  of	  clawback	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  The	  choice	  of	  clawback	  structure	  could	  be	  an	  idiosyncratic	  board	  decision	  that	  is	  based	  on	  the	  
personal	  preferences	  of	  board	  members	  for	  a	  principles-­‐based	  versus	  rules-­‐based	  approach.	  Thus,	  
board	  style	  or	  philosophy	  of	  management	  could	  be	  driving	  the	  structures	  of	  clawbacks.	  Two	  other	  
factors	  also	  could	  cause	  the	  structures	  of	  clawback	  provisions	  to	  be	  idiosyncratic.	  First,	  boards	  have	  
to	  decide	  whether	  to	  use	  in-­‐house	  legal	  attorneys	  or	  else	  use	  outside	  legal	  counsel	  to	  assist	  them	  in	  
drafting	  clawback	  provisions.	  Second,	  some	  boards	  employ	  compensation	  advisors/consultants	  from	  
external	  consulting	  firms.	  If	  firms	  tend	  to	  utilize	  their	  own	  in-­‐house	  legal	  counsel	  and/or	  do	  not	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adoption.	  I	  conjecture	  that	  the	  same	  factors	  that	  influence	  governance	  and/or	  the	  
adoption	  of	  clawbacks	  are	  likely	  to	  influence	  their	  structural	  features.	  	  Therefore,	  I	  
present	  the	  following	  hypothesis:	  
H3:	  There	  is	  a	  positive	  association	  between	  clawback	  stringency	  and	  
corporate	  governance	  quality.	  
	  
IV.	  Methodology	  and	  Empirical	  Estimation	  Models	  
This	  section	  explains	  the	  measures	  of	  earnings	  management,	  models,	  and	  
econometric	  methods,	  used	  to	  test	  the	  hypotheses	  developed	  in	  Section	  III.	  
Measures	  of	  Earnings	  Management	  
I	  perform	  regression	  analysis	  to	  assess	  whether	  clawbacks	  are	  associated	  
with	  reduced	  earnings	  management	  activity.	  As	  several	  measures	  of	  earnings	  
management	  have	  been	  employed	  in	  the	  literature,	  for	  robustness,	  I	  use	  five	  
separate	  metrics	  to	  proxy	  for	  earnings	  management:	  (1)	  abnormal	  accruals,	  (2)	  
propensity	  to	  avoid	  a	  loss,	  (3)	  propensity	  to	  avoid	  an	  earnings	  decline,	  (4)	  
discretionary	  revenues,	  and	  (5)	  percent	  total	  accruals.	  Levels	  of	  the	  various	  
measures	  of	  earnings	  management	  are	  computed	  with	  respect	  to	  various	  windows	  
following	  clawback	  adoption.	  
Abnormal	  accruals	  are	  the	  most	  commonly	  employed	  metric	  for	  earnings	  
management	  in	  the	  accounting	  literature.	  I	  estimate	  abnormal	  accruals	  for	  all	  firms	  
in	  Compustat,	  by	  fiscal	  year	  and	  2-­‐digit	  SIC	  code,	  using	  a	  typical	  accruals	  model	  
employed	  in	  the	  literature—the	  Modified	  Jones	  Model	  as	  modified	  by	  Dechow	  et	  al.	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revenue	  growth	  and	  property,	  plant,	  and	  equipment	  (PPE)	  in	  the	  model.	  I	  also	  
incorporate	  the	  Ball	  and	  Shivakumar	  (2006)	  nonlinear	  adjustment.	  I	  require	  a	  
minimum	  of	  20	  observations	  in	  each	  2-­‐digit	  SIC	  code	  group	  and	  exclude	  banks	  and	  
insurance	  companies	  (firms	  with	  2-­‐digit	  SIC	  Codes	  between	  60	  and	  64,	  inclusive).	  
Due	  to	  the	  inherent	  noisiness	  of	  accruals,	  I	  also	  employ	  two	  benchmark-­‐
beating	  measures	  of	  earnings	  management:	  the	  avoidance	  of	  a	  loss	  and	  the	  
avoidance	  of	  an	  earnings	  decline.11	  Missing	  benchmarks	  can	  have	  important	  
consequences	  for	  firms,	  for	  example,	  adverse	  capital	  market	  reactions.	  (Dechow	  et	  
al.	  2003).	  (Burgstahler	  and	  Dichev	  (1997)	  and	  Phillips	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  find	  that	  firms	  
actively	  engage	  in	  earnings	  management	  to	  avoid	  having	  to	  report	  earnings	  declines	  
and	  losses.	  Burgstahler	  and	  Dichev	  1997	  document	  important	  discontinuities	  in	  
earnings	  and	  earnings	  change	  distributions	  and	  Phillips	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  reports	  that	  
firms	  reporting	  a	  small	  profit	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  larger	  discretionary	  accruals,	  
suggestive	  of	  earnings	  management.	  
As	  a	  sensitivity	  test,	  I	  employ	  two	  recently	  developed	  measures	  of	  earnings	  
management:	  (1)	  discretionary	  revenue,	  following	  the	  Stubben	  (2011)	  model,	  and	  
(2)	  percent	  total	  accruals,	  following	  Hafzalla	  et	  al.	  (2010).	  Stubben	  (2011)	  defends	  
the	  use	  of	  discretionary	  revenue	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  earnings	  management	  on	  the	  basis	  
that	  (1)	  revenue	  is	  an	  important	  account	  where	  extensive	  manipulations	  have	  been	  
found	  to	  occur,	  as	  cited	  in	  SEC	  enforcement	  actions,	  (2)	  discretionary	  revenue	  is	  less	  
noisy	  than	  traditional	  aggregate	  accruals	  measures,	  (3)	  discretionary	  revenue	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  In	  the	  interest	  of	  maximizing	  an	  already	  modest	  sample	  size,	  I	  avoid	  the	  use	  of	  metrics	  such	  as	  
meeting	  versus	  beating	  analyst	  forecasts	  that	  require	  analyst	  following.	  However,	  a	  future	  extension	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models	  outperform	  traditional	  accruals	  models	  in	  a	  simulation	  designed	  to	  detect	  
earnings	  management	  attributable	  to	  both	  revenue	  and	  expense	  manipulations,	  
especially	  for	  growth	  firms,	  and	  (4)	  discretionary	  revenue	  models	  are	  able	  to	  
successfully	  delineate	  manipulations	  in	  a	  sample	  of	  SEC	  enforcement	  actions	  while	  
traditional	  accruals	  models	  were	  unsuccessful.	  I	  estimate	  discretionary	  revenue	  for	  
all	  firms	  in	  Compustat	  with	  available	  data	  by	  3-­‐digit	  SIC	  code,	  subject	  to	  data	  
availability.	  Otherwise,	  I	  use	  2-­‐digit	  or	  1-­‐digit	  SIC	  code,	  respectively.	  Percent	  total	  
accruals	  provide	  a	  relative	  comparison	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  firm’s	  earnings	  are	  
attributable	  to	  accruals	  (non-­‐cash	  items).	  Hafzalla	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  define	  percent	  total	  
accruals	  as	  the	  quantity	  of	  net	  income	  less	  the	  sum	  of	  net	  dividends	  and	  
distributions	  to	  and	  from	  equity-­‐holders	  and	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  cash	  balance,	  scaled	  
by	  the	  absolute	  value	  of	  net	  income.	  Using	  this	  metric,	  they	  rank	  firms	  into	  deciles	  
and	  they	  demonstrate	  sizeable	  hedge	  returns,	  indicating	  an	  even	  more	  extreme	  
accruals	  anomaly	  than	  that	  first	  documented	  by	  Sloan	  (1996).	  Although	  these	  latter	  
two	  measures	  have	  not	  been	  tested	  extensively	  in	  the	  literature	  yet,	  I	  use	  them	  for	  
robustness	  tests.	  	  
Control	  Variables	  –	  Other	  Determinants	  of	  Financial	  Reporting	  Quality	  
In	  the	  regressions	  that	  estimate	  the	  effects	  of	  clawback	  stringency,	  I	  control	  
for	  the	  levels	  of	  seven	  classes	  of	  factors	  identified	  in	  previous	  literature	  to	  be	  
associated	  with	  earnings	  management,	  as	  applicable.	  The	  first	  six:	  “(1)	  firm	  
characteristics,	  (2)	  financial	  reporting	  practices,	  (3)	  governance	  and	  controls,	  (4)	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review	  of	  earnings	  management	  literature	  by	  Dechow	  at	  al.	  (2010).	  The	  final	  factor,	  
(7)	  executive	  compensation	  practices,	  is	  based	  on	  previous	  literature,	  (Shrieves	  and	  
Gao	  2002;	  Bergstresser	  and	  Philippon	  2004),	  which	  indicates	  that	  a	  firm’s	  executive	  
compensation	  practices	  can	  be	  a	  determinant	  of	  earnings	  management.	  Control	  
variables	  are	  discussed	  below	  and	  detailed	  definitions	  are	  provided	  in	  Table	  2.	  
Depending	  on	  the	  measure	  of	  earnings	  management	  estimated,	  there	  are	  slight	  
modifications	  to	  the	  set	  of	  control	  variables	  applied.	  
<Insert	  Table	  2	  about	  here.>	   	  
Firm	  Attributes	  
Multiple	  studies	  (e.g.,	  Kinney	  and	  McDaniel	  1989;	  Dechow	  et	  al.	  2010;	  
Beneish	  1999;	  Sweeney	  1994;	  DeFond	  and	  Jiambalvo	  1994;	  Dichev	  and	  Skinner	  
2002)	  document	  negative	  associations	  between	  either	  a	  firm’s	  leverage	  or	  a	  firm’s	  
proximity	  to	  debt	  covenants	  and	  earnings	  quality.	  Due	  to	  empirical	  difficulties	  in	  
estimating	  a	  firm’s	  proximity	  to	  debt	  covenants,	  I	  control	  for	  leverage.	  Based	  on	  
previous	  literature,	  I	  expect	  the	  coefficient	  on	  the	  leverage	  variable	  to	  load	  
positively.	  I	  separately	  control	  for	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  firm	  is	  a	  financial	  firm	  or	  utility	  
firm.	  Finally,	  I	  control	  for	  net	  operating	  cash	  flow	  scaled	  by	  lagged	  total	  assets.	  	  By	  
controlling	  for	  the	  natural	  logarithm	  of	  a	  firm’s	  return	  on	  assets	  in	  the	  abnormal	  
accruals	  regressions	  and	  by	  removing	  firms	  experiencing	  a	  loss	  from	  the	  percent	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analyses.12	  I	  exclude	  control	  variables	  that	  are	  mechanically	  functions	  of	  sales	  
revenue	  or	  net	  income	  from	  the	  regressions	  that	  explain	  discretionary	  revenue,	  loss	  
avoidance,	  percent	  total	  accruals,	  or	  earnings	  decline	  avoidance,	  but	  in	  the	  
remaining	  regressions,	  I	  control	  for	  sales	  growth,	  the	  percentage	  change	  in	  sales	  
revenue.	  Similarly,	  I	  exclude	  scaled	  net	  operating	  cash	  flow	  from	  the	  percent	  total	  
accruals	  regression	  since	  net	  operating	  cash	  flow	  is	  a	  component	  of	  the	  dependent	  
variable.	  In	  the	  loss	  avoidance	  and	  earnings	  decline	  avoidance	  regressions,	  I	  control	  
for	  abnormal	  accruals	  since	  firms	  can	  manipulate	  accruals	  to	  avoid	  missing	  
benchmarks.	  
Financial	  Reporting	  Practices	  
Previous	  studies	  link	  financial	  reporting	  quality	  to	  firms’	  accounting	  method	  
choices	  or	  accounting	  principles.	  Since	  I	  focus	  on	  overall	  financial	  reporting	  quality	  
and	  all	  sample	  firms	  apply	  U.S.	  GAAP,	  I	  do	  not	  attempt	  to	  control	  for	  specific	  
financial	  reporting	  practices.	  	  
Auditor	  Attributes	  
Various	  studies	  document	  that	  having	  a	  Big	  4	  auditor	  is	  associated	  with	  higher	  
financial	  reporting	  quality.	  Thus,	  I	  control	  for	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  firm	  employs	  a	  Big	  4	  
auditor	  and	  predict	  a	  negative	  coefficient.13	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Firms	  experiencing	  a	  net	  loss	  may	  be	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  the	  other	  firms	  in	  that	  their	  
executives	  are	  either	  not	  successful	  at	  managing	  earnings	  or	  they	  reside	  in	  a	  more	  volatile	  industry,	  
in	  which	  case,	  a	  measure	  of	  their	  earnings	  management	  would	  be	  more	  noisy.	  I	  do	  not	  expect	  
clawbacks	  to	  necessarily	  have	  a	  marginal	  impact	  on	  the	  financial	  reporting	  behavior	  of	  loss	  firms.	  
13	  Although	  I	  find	  very	  limited	  variation,	  as	  nearly	  all	  firms	  employ	  a	  Big	  4	  auditor,	  the	  inclusion	  or	  
exclusion	  of	  the	  variable	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  results,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  loss	  avoidance	  model.	  I	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Equity	  Market	  Incentives	  
Dechow	  et	  al.	  (1996)	  document	  a	  negative	  association	  between	  demand	  for	  
external	  financing	  and	  earnings	  quality.	  Therefore,	  I	  control	  for	  ex	  ante	  demand	  for	  
external	  financing	  using	  the	  Dechow	  et.	  al.	  (1996)	  Ex-­‐Ante	  Measure	  of	  Demand	  for	  
External	  Financing	  and	  I	  expect	  a	  positive	  coefficient	  loading,	  as	  I	  explain	  earnings	  
management.	  Alternatively,	  I	  control	  for	  equity	  market	  incentives	  with	  a	  dummy	  
variable	  set	  equal	  to	  one	  if	  a	  firm	  either	  experienced	  a	  percentage	  change	  in	  long-­‐
term	  debt	  is	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  20%	  or	  a	  change	  in	  common	  shares	  
outstanding	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  10%,	  and	  otherwise	  set	  equal	  to	  zero.	  
External	  Factors	  
Some	  of	  the	  most	  commonly	  studied	  external	  factors	  found	  to	  be	  associated	  
with	  levels	  of	  earnings	  management	  are	  firm	  capital	  requirements,	  tax	  regulations,	  
and	  SOX.	  I	  do	  not	  expect	  any	  of	  these	  three	  factors	  to	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  my	  
study,	  and	  therefore	  do	  not	  control	  for	  them.14	  
Governance	  and	  Controls	  
Based	  on	  the	  previous	  discussion	  about	  governance	  and	  financial	  reporting,	  I	  
control	  for	  governance	  using	  an	  overall	  index	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  ACY	  (2011),15	  and	  
expect	  a	  negative	  coefficient	  loading	  on	  the	  index.	  In	  instances	  where	  I	  interact	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Since	  I	  will	  be	  excluding	  from	  my	  sample	  all	  firms	  that	  had	  to	  mandatorily	  adopt	  TARP/EESA	  
clawbacks,	  I	  do	  not	  expect	  to	  have	  many	  financial	  firms	  in	  the	  sample.	  Since	  I	  will	  be	  comparing	  
earnings	  management	  for	  firms	  at	  different	  points	  in	  time,	  based	  upon	  their	  clawback	  adoption	  dates,	  
any	  new	  tax	  regulations	  should	  not	  have	  a	  systematic	  effect	  on	  firms	  during	  the	  sample	  period	  of	  my	  
analysis.	  As	  expected,	  I	  find	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  clawback	  provisions	  in	  my	  sample	  (all	  but	  3)	  
were	  adopted	  in	  the	  post-­‐SOX	  period	  and	  far	  enough	  after	  the	  implementation	  of	  SOX	  that	  SOX	  
should	  not	  be	  a	  confounding	  variable.	  All	  of	  the	  firms	  except	  for	  the	  three	  adopted	  in	  2005	  or	  later.	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governance	  quality	  with	  other	  variables,	  I	  split	  this	  index	  at	  the	  population	  median16	  
to	  develop	  a	  dichotomous	  measure	  of	  high/low	  governance	  quality.	  Since	  clawbacks	  
may	  be	  implemented	  in	  conjunction	  with	  other	  corporate	  regime	  changes	  that	  can	  
impact	  financial	  reporting,	  I	  control	  for	  executive	  turnover	  through	  use	  of	  an	  
indicator	  variable.	  I	  do	  not	  predict	  a	  sign	  for	  the	  coefficient	  on	  this	  indicator	  
variable,	  as	  turnover	  could	  either	  enhance	  or	  harm	  earnings	  quality.	  	  
Executive	  Compensation	  Practices	  
I	  control	  for	  the	  proportion	  of	  total	  CEO17	  compensation	  that	  is	  non-­‐salary-­‐
based	  and	  the	  magnitude	  of	  a	  CEO’s	  incentive	  compensation	  scaled	  by	  net	  income	  or	  
a	  firm’s	  decile	  rank	  for	  this	  ratio	  compared	  to	  all	  other	  firms	  in	  Compustat	  with	  
available	  data,	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  incentive	  compensation	  to	  the	  firm.	  I	  
expect	  positive	  coefficients	  for	  these	  variables	  based	  on	  prior	  literature	  suggesting	  a	  
positive	  association	  between	  incentive	  compensation	  and	  earnings	  management.	  	  
	  
Testing	  Hypothesis	  1	  and	  Hypothesis	  2-­‐	  Estimating	  the	  Effect	  of	  Stringency	  and	  
the	  Mediating	  Effects	  of	  Antecedent	  Corporate	  Governance	  Quality	  
Before	  investigating	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  governance	  or	  other	  firm	  
characteristics	  are	  systematically	  associated	  with	  stringency,	  (which	  I	  later	  
examine),	  I	  test	  H1	  and	  H2	  with	  the	  following	  OLS	  regression	  equation:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  I	  split	  this	  index	  at	  the	  population	  median	  for	  all	  firms	  in	  Compustat	  with	  available	  governance	  
data.	  Given	  that	  I	  find	  that	  none	  of	  the	  firms	  adopting	  clawbacks	  had	  CEO	  and	  Chairman	  duality	  in	  the	  
year	  of	  or	  prior	  to	  clawback	  adoption,	  I	  conclude	  that	  the	  adopting	  firms	  had	  strong	  overall	  
governance	  and	  do	  not	  want	  to	  force	  them	  into	  high	  and	  low	  governance	  categories	  based	  on	  a	  
comparison	  amongst	  one	  another.	  
17	  I	  control	  for	  CEO	  compensation	  because	  CFO	  compensation	  data	  is	  not	  available	  for	  all	  firm	  years	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Equation	  1.0	  (Test	  of	  H1	  and	  H2	  Applying	  OLS)	  
E.M.	  =	  β0	  +	  β1STRINGENCY	  +	  β2STRINGENCY*HIGHGOV	  +	  β3GOV_INDEX	  +	  
γ’(CONTROLS18)	  +	  ε	  
	  
The	  test	  variable,	  STRINGENCY,	  is	  equal	  to	  a	  firm’s	  clawback	  stringency	  score.	  
The	  computation	  of	  the	  stringency	  measure	  is	  explained	  in	  Table	  4.	  Clawback	  
attributes	  that	  increase	  the	  certainty	  or	  magnitude	  of	  a	  compensation	  recovery	  
increase	  the	  stringency	  score.	  Based	  on	  deterrence	  theory,	  H1	  predicts	  a	  negative	  
coefficient	  for	  β1.	  H2	  predicts	  a	  positive	  coefficient	  for	  β2	  that	  is	  smaller	  than	  the	  
absolute	  value	  of	  β1.	  The	  “interaction”	  in	  the	  model	  is	  not	  a	  pure	  interaction,	  as	  the	  
“interaction	  term”	  uses	  a	  dichotomous	  version	  of	  the	  governance	  index,	  whereas	  the	  
base	  variable	  used	  to	  control	  for	  governance	  is	  the	  continuous	  version	  of	  the	  
governance	  index19.	  For	  brevity,	  I	  list	  the	  control	  variables	  in	  Table	  2	  and	  again	  in	  
the	  regression	  results	  tables.	  If	  clawback	  firms	  appear	  more	  than	  once	  in	  a	  given	  
regression	  sample,	  I	  cluster	  standard	  errors.	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Control	  variables	  are	  defined	  in	  Table	  2.	  
19	  This	  is	  necessary	  to	  avoid	  severe	  multicollinearity	  problems.	  I	  attempt	  to	  estimate	  the	  model	  with	  
a	  dichotomous	  version	  of	  the	  governance	  in	  the	  interaction	  term	  along	  with	  a	  dichotomous	  base	  and	  
another	  version	  with	  the	  continuous	  governance	  index	  value	  in	  the	  interaction	  term	  and	  the	  
continuous	  governance	  index	  as	  a	  base.	  Both	  of	  these	  specifications	  produced	  severe	  
multicollinearity	  that	  made	  all	  coefficients	  in	  the	  models	  insignificant,	  with	  p-­‐values	  close	  to	  1.0.	  The	  
only	  way	  to	  estimate	  the	  model	  with	  reliable	  coefficients	  was	  to	  use	  the	  “quasi	  interaction	  term”	  
specification	  listed	  above	  in	  Equation	  1.0.	  I	  refer	  to	  this	  term	  as	  an	  interaction,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  not	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Testing	  Hypothesis	  3	  –	  Predicting	  Clawback	  Stringency	  and	  Examining	  the	  
Relation	  Between	  Corporate	  Governance	  Quality	  and	  Clawback	  Stringency	  
In	  H3	  I	  investigate	  one	  particular	  avenue	  through	  which	  corporate	  
governance	  quality	  might	  impact	  clawback	  effectiveness.	  I	  examine	  how	  corporate	  
governance	  quality	  influences	  firm	  selection	  of	  clawback	  stringency.	  I	  test	  for	  a	  
structural	  association	  between	  corporate	  governance	  and	  clawback	  stringency,	  
among	  firms	  that	  adopt	  clawbacks,	  using	  a	  model	  that	  incorporates	  many	  of	  the	  
potential	  determinants	  of	  clawback	  adoption	  investigated	  by	  ACY	  (2011),	  Brown	  et	  
al.	  (2011),	  and	  Gao	  et	  al.	  (2010),	  with	  slight	  modification.20	  	  
I	  estimate	  the	  following	  ordered	  probit	  choice	  model	  to	  predict	  stringency:	  
Equation	  2.0	  
Probit	  (STRINGENCY)	  =	  β0	  +	  β1GOVERNANCE_INDEX_LAG1	  +	  
β2CEO_CHAIR_DUALITY_LAG1	  +	  β3CEO_TURNOVER_LAG1	  +	  β4GOODWILL_IMPAIR	  +	  
β5LN_ASSET_LAG1	  +	  β6CAPITAL_INTENSITY	  +	  β7INDUSTRY_AVG_RDTOSALE	  +	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  I	  add	  a	  few	  additional	  predictor	  variables	  and	  slightly	  modify	  their	  variable	  definitions	  to	  suit	  my	  
sample	  period.	  Variable	  definitions	  are	  provided	  in	  Table	  3.	  In	  untabulated	  analyses,	  similar	  to	  ACY	  
(2011),	  I	  control	  for	  both	  ease	  of	  earnings	  management	  and	  noise	  in	  the	  accounting	  system.	  They	  are	  
measured	  using	  the	  median	  level	  of	  abnormal	  accruals	  during	  the	  period	  from	  4	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  
current	  fiscal	  year,	  leading	  up	  to	  2	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  current	  fiscal	  year,	  and	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  
abnormal	  accruals	  during	  the	  past	  5	  fiscal	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  current	  one,	  respectively.	  Due	  to	  
multicollinearity	  issues,	  I	  also	  run	  a	  specification	  omitting	  the	  ease	  of	  earnings	  management	  variable,	  
since	  ease	  of	  earnings	  management	  is	  not	  significant	  and	  has	  a	  larger	  p-­‐value.	  However,	  noise	  is	  not	  
significant	  in	  either	  regression	  and	  ease	  of	  earnings	  management	  is	  not	  significant	  in	  the	  
specification	  including	  both.	  I	  investigate	  whether	  information	  risk	  is	  a	  determinant	  of	  stringency.	  
ACY	  (2011)	  measure	  information	  risk	  in	  the	  accounting	  system	  by	  changes	  in	  “long-­‐term	  non-­‐cash	  
net	  operating	  assets”	  consistent	  with	  the	  definitions	  employed	  by	  Dechow,	  Ge,	  Larson,	  and	  Sloan	  
(2007)	  and	  Richardson,	  Sloan,	  Soliman,	  and	  Tuna	  (2005).	  They	  gather	  data	  on	  duality	  of	  the	  CEO	  and	  
Chairman	  positions	  from	  proxy	  statements	  in	  2007	  for	  non-­‐adopters,	  and	  the	  year	  of	  clawback	  
adoption	  for	  firms	  adopting	  clawbacks.	  I	  find	  no	  evidence	  that	  information	  risk	  significantly	  
influences	  stringency.	  Finally,	  I	  find	  no	  evidence	  that	  a	  dummy	  for	  financial	  institutions	  has	  a	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β8FINANCE	  +	  β9UTIL_FIRM	  +	  β10CEOCOMP_MIX	  	  +	  
β11CEOCOMP_MIXxDEC_INCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	  +	  β12ADOPTION_SPEED	  +	  ε	  
	  
Table	  3	  provides	  definitions	  for	  the	  predictor	  variables.	  Table	  4	  explains	  the	  
computation	  of	  the	  stringency	  measure.	  The	  predictor	  variables	  in	  this	  model	  may	  
be	  grouped	  into	  five	  categories:	  (1)	  governance,	  (2)	  financial	  reporting,	  (3)	  financial,	  
(4)	  compensation,	  and	  (5)	  other.	  The	  predictor	  variables	  and	  their	  anticipated	  signs	  
are	  discussed	  below.	  
Governance	  Predictors	  
I	  control	  for	  a	  firm’s	  overall	  corporate	  governance	  quality	  using	  an	  index	  
similar	  to	  the	  ACY	  (2011)	  index.	  I	  expect	  this	  index	  to	  load	  positively.	  I	  also	  
separately	  control	  for	  duality	  of	  the	  CEO	  and	  board	  chairman	  positions.	  In	  addition,	  I	  
control	  for	  CEO21	  turnover,	  as	  I	  anticipate	  that	  clawback	  adoptions	  will	  be	  more	  
stringent	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  corporate	  regime	  change	  characterized	  by	  top	  
executive	  turnover	  since	  management	  resistance	  to	  clawback	  adoption	  may	  be	  
mitigated	  in	  such	  instances.	  	  
Financial	  Reporting	  Predictors	  
	   Similar	  to	  ACY	  (2011),	  subject	  to	  data	  availability,	  I	  control	  for	  noise	  in	  the	  
accounting	  system.	  Clawbacks	  accompanies	  by	  greater	  risk	  in	  the	  accounting	  system	  
would	  inflict	  a	  larger	  incremental	  compensation	  risk	  on	  the	  manager.	  Based	  on	  the	  
finding	  of	  LS	  (2010)	  that	  the	  optimality	  of	  clawback	  provisions	  depends	  on	  noise	  in	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the	  accounting	  system,	  I	  use	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  and	  median	  of	  abnormal	  
accruals	  during	  the	  five	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  earliest	  clawback	  adoption	  as	  a	  
proxy	  for	  this	  attribute.	  However,	  I	  ultimately	  remove	  the	  noise	  variable	  due	  to	  lack	  
of	  significance.	  In	  addition,	  I	  control	  for	  presence	  of	  a	  recent	  financial	  restatement	  
and	  for	  past	  history	  with	  fraud	  I	  expect	  positive	  coefficients	  for	  both	  of	  these	  
variables,	  as	  both	  could	  motivate	  boards	  to	  take	  remedial	  action.	  However,	  both	  
variables	  drop	  out	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  incidence	  of	  either	  recent	  fraud	  or	  recent	  history	  of	  
restatement.	  
Financial	  Predictors	  
	   Similar	  to	  Brown	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  firm	  asset	  size	  and	  goodwill	  impairments	  are	  
included	  as	  predictors.	  Debt	  issuance	  and	  equity	  issuance	  are	  controlled	  for	  using	  
the	  variable	  FINANCE,	  which	  is	  set	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  a	  firm’s	  percentage	  change	  in	  long-­‐
term	  debt	  is	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  20%	  or	  it’s	  percentage	  change	  in	  common	  
shares	  outstanding	  is	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  10%.	  Both	  of	  these	  variables	  are	  
expected	  to	  have	  positive	  coefficients.	  	  
Executive	  Compensation	  Predictors	  
I	  control	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  bonus/incentive	  compensation	  to	  the	  
executive	  using	  the	  percentage	  of	  total	  CEO	  compensation	  that	  is	  non-­‐salary	  and	  the	  
importance	  of	  bonus/incentive-­‐based	  compensation	  to	  the	  firm,	  based	  on	  the	  ratio	  
of	  the	  CEO’s	  non-­‐salary-­‐based	  compensation	  to	  net	  income.	  I	  interact	  the	  latter	  
measure	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  non-­‐salary-­‐based	  compensation	  to	  the	  firm	  with	  the	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omit	  the	  base	  variable	  capturing	  the	  importance	  of	  non-­‐salary-­‐based	  compensation	  
to	  the	  firm.)	  These	  performance-­‐based	  compensation	  measures	  are	  expected	  to	  load	  
positively.	  
Other	  Firm	  Characteristic	  Predictors	  
	  A	  separate	  indicator	  variable	  is	  used	  to	  identify	  firms	  that	  are	  utility	  firms.	  
Although,	  I	  investigate	  whether	  financial	  firms	  are	  associated	  with	  increased	  
stringency,	  I	  find	  that	  a	  financial	  firm	  dummy	  is	  insignificant	  and	  remove	  it.	  Table	  3	  
provides	  more	  detailed	  definitions	  for	  each	  of	  the	  variables.	  
Berry	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  investigate	  various	  firm	  characteristics	  that	  can	  serve	  as	  
determinants	  of	  governance.	  Berry	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  argue	  that	  monitoring	  may	  pose	  
more	  challenges	  for	  firms	  whose	  assets	  bases	  are	  comprised	  more	  heavily	  of	  
intangible	  assets.	  They	  proxy	  for	  asset	  intangibility	  with	  two	  measures:	  capital	  
intensity	  and	  industry	  average	  R&D-­‐to-­‐sales.	  Therefore,	  I	  include	  both	  of	  these	  
measures	  as	  potential	  determinants	  of	  clawback	  stringency.	  Following	  Berry	  et	  al.	  
(2006),	  I	  also	  measure	  capital	  intensity	  as	  net	  fixed	  assets	  divided	  by	  total	  assets	  
and	  I	  compute	  industry	  R&D-­‐to-­‐sales	  as	  the	  average	  ratio	  of	  research	  and	  
development	  expense	  to	  sales	  for	  each	  2-­‐digit	  SIC	  Code.	  On	  one	  hand,	  clawbacks	  
might	  be	  a	  critical	  component	  of	  governance	  at	  firms	  where	  monitoring	  is	  more	  
difficult.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  I	  expect	  that	  at	  firms	  where	  monitoring	  is	  more	  difficult,	  
overall	  governance	  will	  be	  weaker,	  and	  therefore,	  such	  firms	  would	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  
adopt	  a	  stringent	  clawback,	  an	  additional	  component	  of	  governance.	  Finally,	  I	  




	   32	  
expect	  it	  to	  load	  positively.	  I	  expect	  that	  a	  firm’s	  quickness	  to	  adopt	  may	  be	  related	  
to	  its	  underlying	  motivation	  for	  implementing	  a	  clawback	  provision,	  which	  should	  
drive	  a	  firm’s	  choice	  of	  clawback	  structure.	  I	  define	  the	  adoption	  speed	  as	  the	  year	  of	  
clawback	  adoption	  subtracted	  from	  2010	  (the	  year	  that	  the	  DF	  Bill	  was	  passed).	  The	  
characteristics	  of	  firm’	  clawback	  provisions	  are	  summarized	  in	  Table	  5.	  
<Insert	  Tables	  3,	  4,	  and	  5	  about	  here.>	  
	  
Econometric	  Approaches	  for	  Self-­‐Selection	  
If	  there	  is	  a	  systematic	  association	  between	  clawback	  stringency	  and	  
corporate	  governance,	  supporting	  H3	  (or	  significant	  associations	  between	  clawback	  
stringency	  and	  other	  firm	  characteristics),	  it	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  apply	  econometric	  
remedies	  that	  address	  selection	  bias	  when	  estimating	  the	  marginal	  effects	  of	  
stringency	  on	  earnings	  management.	  Attributes	  such	  as	  governance	  might	  not	  only	  
influence	  a	  firm’s	  stringency	  decision,	  but	  might	  also	  influence	  a	  firm’s	  subsequent	  
response	  to	  clawback	  stringency,	  thereby	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  isolate	  the	  effect	  of	  
the	  stringency	  on	  earnings	  management.	  In	  this	  situation,	  an	  OLS	  regression	  could	  
incorrectly	  attributing	  to	  clawbacks	  reductions	  in	  earnings	  management	  activity	  
that	  are	  really	  due	  to	  concurrent	  firm	  characteristics	  or	  decisions,	  thus,	  potentially	  
overstating	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  clawbacks	  constrain	  earnings	  management.	  	  
A	  firm’s	  decision	  to	  implement	  a	  given	  level	  of	  clawback	  stringency	  is	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level	  experiment.	  Firms	  that	  voluntarily	  choose	  high	  levels	  of	  stringency	  may	  be	  
fundamentally	  different	  from	  firms	  that	  choose	  low	  levels	  of	  stringency.	  	  
In	  the	  study	  at	  hand,	  it	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  voluntary	  
clawbacks	  effectively	  mitigate	  earnings	  management	  behavior	  (a	  response	  
variable).	  Specifically,	  this	  study	  attempts	  to	  estimate	  the	  “treatment	  effects”	  of	  
clawback	  stringency	  on	  firms’	  financial	  reporting	  behavior,	  with	  a	  firm’s	  response	  to	  
“treatment”	  measured	  by	  a	  firm’s	  level	  of	  earnings	  management	  activity,	  meanwhile	  
controlling	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  other	  covariates	  known	  to	  also	  influence	  earnings	  
management	  behavior.	  Unfortunately,	  however,	  given	  that	  clawbacks	  are	  not	  
implemented	  in	  a	  controlled	  experimental	  environment,	  this	  poses	  some	  challenges	  
when	  estimating	  their	  causal	  effects.	  Specifically,	  when	  estimating	  the	  effect	  of	  
clawback	  stringency	  on	  firms’	  earnings	  management	  behavior,	  one	  must	  make	  a	  
counterfactual	  assumption	  about	  how	  the	  firms’	  levels	  of	  earnings	  management	  
would	  have	  been	  during	  the	  same	  period,	  absent	  the	  particular	  level	  of	  stringency.	  
Since	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  observe	  this,	  it	  becomes	  necessary	  to	  find	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  
counterfactual	  outcome.	  (Tucker,	  2011)	  One	  way	  to	  develop	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  
counterfactual	  outcome	  would	  be	  to	  examine	  the	  earnings	  management	  behavior	  of	  
similar	  firms	  that	  implemented	  different	  levels	  of	  stringency	  or	  did	  not	  adopt	  
clawbacks.	  In	  this	  study,	  however,	  I	  restrict	  the	  focus	  to	  analyzing	  the	  differential	  
effects	  of	  stringency	  among	  firms	  that	  actually	  adopted	  clawback	  provisions.	  
The	  test	  of	  H3	  investigates	  whether,	  after	  conditioning	  on	  clawback	  adoption,	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where	  possible,	  I	  apply	  an	  econometric	  technique	  –Two	  Stage	  Heckman	  (1979)	  
estimation	  –	  to	  estimate	  the	  effects	  of	  clawback	  stringency	  and	  evaluate	  the	  extent	  
to	  which	  self-­‐selection	  may	  be	  present.	  The	  Heckman	  model	  estimates	  the	  average	  
treatment	  effect	  (ATE)	  of	  clawback	  stringency	  (dose)	  on	  earnings	  management	  
behavior	  for	  each	  governance-­‐level	  group.22	  
The	  Two-­‐Stage	  Heckman	  approach	  utilizes	  a	  first	  stage	  selection	  model	  to	  
predict	  stringency	  that	  is	  identical	  to	  Equation	  2.0.	  The	  first	  stage	  selection	  model	  is	  
used	  to	  estimate	  an	  inverse	  Mills	  ratio	  that	  is	  subsequently	  inserted	  as	  a	  control	  
variable	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  equation	  that	  explains	  earnings	  management.23	  The	  
inverse	  Mills	  ratio	  attempts	  to	  control	  for	  remaining,	  unobservable	  common	  
covariates	  that	  could	  commonly	  influence	  both	  clawback	  structure	  and	  subsequent	  
earnings	  management	  behavior.	  A	  statistically	  significant	  inverse	  Mills	  ratio	  would	  
indicate	  that	  there	  is	  selection	  bias,	  while	  an	  insignificant	  inverse	  Mills	  ratio	  would	  
mitigate	  concerns	  about	  selection	  bias.	  A	  limitation	  of	  the	  Heckman	  approach,	  
however,	  is	  that	  it	  requires	  strict	  distributional	  assumptions:	  linearity	  of	  the	  
outcome	  regression,	  a	  probit	  selection	  model	  in	  the	  first	  stage,	  and	  bivariate	  normal	  
distributions	  for	  unobservable	  factors	  in	  both	  stages.	  (Tucker,	  2011).	  	  
Under	  the	  Heckman	  (1979)	  approach,	  after	  estimating	  the	  inverse-­‐Mills	  ratio	  from	  
the	  selection	  equation,	  I	  test	  H1	  and	  H2	  with	  the	  following	  regression	  equation:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  In	  untabulated	  analyses,	  I	  find	  that	  when	  applying	  the	  Two-­‐Stage	  Heckman	  Model	  to	  the	  abnormal	  
accruals,	  percent	  total	  accruals,	  and	  discretionary	  revenue	  analyses,	  the	  inverse	  Mills	  ratio	  is	  
insignificant,	  when	  only	  adopting	  firms	  are	  considered	  and	  also	  when	  both	  adopting	  and	  non-­‐
adopting	  firms	  are	  included	  in	  the	  regressions.	  Thus,	  I	  conclude	  that	  selection	  bias	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  
be	  significant.	  
23	  Each	  clawback-­‐adopting	  firm	  is	  allowed	  to	  enter	  the	  sample	  once	  and	  appears	  during	  the	  fiscal	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Equation	  3.0	  (Test	  of	  H1	  and	  H2	  Using	  Heckman	  Two-­‐Stage	  Approach)	  
E.M.	  =	  β0	  +	  β1STRINGENCY	  +	  β2STRINGENCY*HIGHGOV	  +	  β3GOV_INDEX	  +	  
γ’(CONTROLS)	  +	  ρσ(IMR)	  +	  ε	  
	  
To	  satisfy	  the	  exclusion	  restriction	  of	  the	  instrumental	  variables	  approach	  
required	  by	  the	  Heckman	  technique,	  I	  exclude	  several	  variables	  from	  the	  second	  
stage	  equation	  that	  are	  included	  in	  the	  selection	  equation,	  (e.g.,	  adoption	  speed,	  
industry	  average	  R&D-­‐to	  sales,	  and	  capital	  intensity).	  The	  latter	  two	  factors	  are	  
significantly	  associated	  with	  clawback	  stringency,	  but	  not	  significant	  in	  explaining	  
earnings	  management	  in	  any	  of	  the	  regressions	  in	  which	  they	  would	  be	  included.	  
(Industry	  average	  R&D-­‐to	  sales	  would	  be	  excluded	  as	  a	  control	  variable	  in	  the	  loss	  
avoidance	  and	  earnings	  decline	  avoidance	  regressions,	  as	  it	  is,	  mechanically,	  a	  
function	  of	  net	  income.)	  Therefore,	  capital	  intensity	  can	  serve	  as	  an	  instrument	  in	  all	  
of	  the	  regressions	  and,	  in	  some	  of	  the	  regressions,	  industry	  average	  R&D-­‐to	  sales	  
can	  operate	  as	  an	  instrument	  as	  well.	  Surprisingly,	  adoption	  speed	  does	  not	  appear	  
to	  significantly	  influence	  clawback	  stringency,	  indicating	  that	  it	  would	  not	  function	  
as	  a	  strong	  instrument.	  Again,	  as	  in	  the	  OLS	  estimation,	  H1	  predicts	  that	  β1	  and	  
(β1+β2)	  in	  Equation	  3.0	  will	  both	  be	  negative.	  However,	  H2	  predicts	  that	  β2	  will	  be	  
positive	  and	  smaller	  than	  the	  absolute	  value	  of	  β1.	  As	  mentioned	  previously	  in	  the	  
discussion	  of	  Equation	  1.0,	  to	  avoid	  severe	  multicollinearity,	  the	  “interaction”	  in	  the	  
model	  is	  not	  a	  pure	  interaction,	  since	  the	  continuous	  governance	  index	  is	  used	  as	  a	  
base	  in	  the	  model,	  but	  a	  dichotomous	  version	  of	  the	  governance	  index	  is	  applied	  in	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V.	  Sample	  Selection	  and	  Measurement	  of	  Variables	  
Sample	  Selection	  –	  Identification	  of	  Voluntary	  Adopters	  
I	  conducted	  comprehensive	  keyword	  searches	  on	  LexisNexis24	  to	  identify	  
firms	  that	  announced	  an	  adoption	  of	  a	  clawback	  provision	  prior	  to	  July	  21,	  2010,	  the	  
date	  on	  which	  the	  DF	  legislation	  was	  passed.	  These	  announcements	  appear	  in	  the	  
Exhibit	  10	  –	  Material	  Contracts	  section	  of	  8-­‐K,	  10-­‐K,	  10-­‐Q	  documents	  for	  provisions	  
that	  are	  drafted	  into	  employment	  agreements	  and	  also	  appear	  in	  proxy	  statement	  
filings	  with	  the	  SEC.	  As	  an	  alternative	  to	  making	  a	  clawback	  provision	  a	  part	  of	  an	  
employment	  contract,	  firms	  may	  modify	  their	  corporate	  charters	  and	  bylaws	  to	  
include	  the	  provisions.	  Thus,	  I	  also	  searched	  corporate	  charters	  and	  bylaws	  for	  
adoptions	  of	  the	  provisions.	  As	  a	  completeness	  check,	  I	  have	  compared	  my	  sample	  of	  
voluntary	  adopters	  to	  those	  contained	  in	  a	  Corporate	  Library	  document,	  to	  aid	  in	  the	  
identification	  of	  voluntary	  adopters.	  I	  performed	  keyword	  searches	  to	  identify	  firms	  
that	  adopted	  clawback	  provisions	  prior	  to	  July	  21,	  2010	  when	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  became	  
effective25.	  Given	  the	  interest	  in	  identifying	  voluntary	  adopters	  of	  clawbacks,	  I	  
remove	  firms	  from	  my	  sample	  who	  state	  that	  their	  reason	  for	  adoption	  was	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Search	  terms	  are	  available	  from	  the	  author	  upon	  request.	  
25	  As	  a	  sensitivity	  test,	  I	  examine	  results	  if	  I	  remove	  firms	  from	  my	  sample	  that	  implemented	  
clawbacks	  between	  June	  1,	  2010	  and	  July	  21,	  2010,	  as	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  that	  firms	  adopted	  
clawback	  provisions	  just	  before	  the	  passage	  of	  DF	  in	  anticipation	  of	  the	  regulation.	  I	  find	  5	  firms	  that	  
meet	  this	  criterion.	  The	  coefficients	  on	  the	  stringency	  variable	  are	  unchanged.	  However,	  the	  
coefficients	  on	  the	  “interaction	  terms”	  for	  high	  governance	  and	  stringency	  in	  the	  abnormal	  accruals	  
and	  discretionary	  revenue	  regression	  go	  from	  being	  significant	  to	  statistically	  insignificant.	  However,	  
the	  power	  of	  the	  tests	  is	  reduced	  after	  removing	  these	  observations.	  The	  five	  firms	  had	  a	  mean	  
stringency	  of	  9.6	  in	  comparison	  to	  a	  mean	  stringency	  of	  9.27	  for	  the	  other	  firms.	  Overall,	  it	  does	  not	  
appear	  that	  the	  firms	  adopted	  substantially	  different	  clawback	  arrangements	  in	  the	  different	  periods.	  
Given	  that	  the	  SEC	  has	  still	  not	  yet	  adopted	  a	  final	  rule	  concerning	  DF	  clawback	  structures,	  the	  
parameters	  in	  DF	  may	  not	  withstand	  the	  final	  rule,	  and	  thus,	  all	  firms	  that	  adopted	  even	  after	  DF	  have	  
been	  forced	  to	  speculate	  concerning	  the	  final	  rule.	  Managers	  adopting	  just	  prior	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  DF	  
should	  have	  faced	  the	  same	  general	  incentives	  associated	  with	  clawbacks	  as	  the	  managers	  of	  firms	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comply	  with	  TARP	  or	  EESA	  requirements	  since	  those	  were	  forced	  adoptions.	  	  I	  
identified	  286	  voluntary	  adoptions.	  
Variable	  Measurement	  –	  Corporate	  Governance	  Quality	  Levels	  
I	  measure	  corporate	  governance	  quality	  using	  an	  index	  similar	  to	  ACY	  
(2011)26.	  I	  refer	  to	  this	  index	  as	  GOVERNANCE_INDEX	  and	  use	  the	  aforementioned	  
definition	  for	  the	  variable	  as	  defined	  for	  Equation	  1.0.	  	  For	  purposes	  of	  interacting	  
this	  measure	  with	  other	  variables,	  I	  split	  the	  GOVERNANCE_INDEX	  variable	  at	  the	  
population	  median27	  for	  all	  firms	  in	  Compustat	  with	  available	  data	  for	  the	  index	  and	  
characterize	  firms	  that	  are	  above	  the	  median	  as	  “high	  governance	  firms”	  and	  firms	  
that	  are	  below	  the	  population	  median	  as	  “low	  governance	  firms”.	  This	  index	  can	  
accommodate	  missing	  observations	  for	  governance	  variables	  because	  it	  scales	  the	  
constructed	  governance	  score	  for	  each	  firm	  by	  the	  number	  of	  available	  governance	  
elements.	  For	  robustness,	  I	  consider	  removing	  firms	  with	  missing	  governance	  
information.	  However,	  I	  find	  that	  no	  firms	  are	  missing	  governance	  information	  that	  
is	  needed	  to	  compute	  the	  governance	  index.	  
	  
Variable	  Measurement	  –	  Clawback	  Stringency	  
The	  defining	  characteristics	  of	  clawback	  provisions	  were	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  
the	  paper.	  At	  a	  high	  level,	  stringency	  may	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  three	  major	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  I	  omit	  variables	  that	  require	  additional	  hand-­‐collection	  (whether	  or	  not	  the	  company	  is	  a	  family	  
business	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  founder	  has	  remained	  active	  in	  the	  company).	  Variable	  definitions	  
are	  provided	  in	  Table	  3.	  
27	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  the	  adopting	  firms	  have	  strong	  overall	  governance,	  as	  none	  had	  duality	  
of	  the	  CEO	  and	  Chairman	  positions	  in	  either	  the	  fiscal	  year	  of	  or	  prior	  to	  clawback	  adoption.	  Thus,	  I	  
characterize	  firms	  as	  having	  low	  or	  high	  governance	  based	  on	  their	  positioning	  in	  comparison	  with	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components:	  1)	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  a	  clawback	  is	  triggered,	  2)	  the	  amount	  of	  
recovery	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  agreement,	  and	  3)	  the	  extent	  of	  coverage	  of	  firm	  
executives.28	  Stringency	  is	  increasing	  in	  all	  three	  of	  these	  major	  attributes.	  	  
A	  priori,	  I	  have	  no	  theoretical	  basis	  for	  assuming	  that	  any	  single	  clawback	  
attribute	  is	  more	  important	  than	  another,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  previous	  literature	  
indicating	  this	  either.	  Therefore,	  in	  constructing	  the	  stringency	  metric,	  I	  allow	  each	  
incremental	  increase	  in	  an	  attribute	  that	  increases	  the	  certainty	  or	  severity	  of	  a	  
compensation	  recovery	  to	  add	  one	  unit	  to	  a	  firm’s	  overall	  composite	  stringency	  
measure.	  This	  approach	  is	  comparable	  to	  that	  of	  Gompers	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  who	  assign	  
firms	  corporate	  governance	  scores	  based	  on	  the	  inclusion	  of	  various	  governance	  
components	  that	  serve	  to	  reduce	  shareholder	  rights.	  Analogous	  to	  Gompers	  et	  al.	  
(2003)	  who	  allow	  the	  presence	  of	  any	  given	  feature	  of	  corporate	  governance	  to	  add	  
one	  unit	  to	  a	  firm’s	  overall	  corporate	  governance	  index	  score,	  I	  allow	  the	  presence	  of	  
any	  incremental	  clawback	  feature	  that	  increases	  either	  the	  probability	  or	  magnitude	  
of	  a	  clawback	  invocation	  to	  add	  one	  unit	  to	  a	  firm’s	  composite	  stringency	  score	  and	  
the	  absence	  of	  that	  particular	  attribute	  to	  add	  zero	  to	  the	  composite	  score.	  For	  
instance,	  not	  imbedding	  a	  materiality	  threshold	  in	  a	  triggering	  restatement	  or	  a	  
triggering	  misstatement	  adds	  one	  unit	  of	  stringency,	  compared	  to	  establishing	  the	  
triggering	  event	  as	  a	  restatement	  or	  misstatement,	  respectively.	  Thus,	  each	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Based	  on	  an	  earlier	  preliminary	  sample	  of	  voluntary	  clawback	  adoptions,	  I	  find	  almost	  no	  variation	  
in	  the	  pay	  types	  covered	  by	  the	  provisions,	  as	  nearly	  all	  firms	  covered	  all	  bonus	  or	  incentive	  pay	  in	  
their	  policies.	  A	  large	  percentage	  of	  firms	  do	  not	  explicitly	  state	  a	  specific	  length	  for	  the	  recovery	  
period,	  and	  only	  a	  small	  handful	  provide	  for	  a	  symmetric	  recovery.	  Therefore,	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  
remaining	  characteristics	  of	  clawbacks	  in	  measuring	  their	  stringency.	  A	  few	  firms	  recover	  the	  entire	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incremental	  increase	  in	  stringency	  is	  reflected	  as	  a	  one-­‐unit	  increase	  in	  the	  
composite	  stringency	  measure.	  However,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  components	  of	  
the	  triggering	  conditions	  are	  more	  important	  than	  the	  remaining	  attributes	  because	  
they	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  clawback	  will	  occur,	  and	  if	  a	  clawback	  does	  not	  
take	  place,	  the	  other	  attributes	  have	  no	  effect.	  Therefore,	  as	  a	  sensitivity	  test,	  I	  
construct	  a	  second	  stringency	  measure	  in	  which	  each	  incremental	  increase	  in	  the	  
stringency	  of	  a	  triggering	  condition	  adds	  twice	  as	  much	  (two	  units)	  to	  the	  overall	  
composite	  stringency	  score.	  In	  addition,	  I	  implement	  two	  other	  stringency	  
measures—one	  that	  assigns	  equal	  weights	  to	  all	  categories	  that	  form	  the	  stringency	  
score	  and	  one	  that	  assigns	  twice	  as	  much	  weight	  to	  the	  three	  triggering	  condition	  
components	  as	  it	  does	  to	  the	  other	  two	  components.	  Table	  4	  summarizes	  the	  
primary	  stringency	  measure	  and	  the	  first	  alternative	  measure,	  displaying	  each	  of	  the	  
components	  whose	  scores	  are	  summed	  to	  form	  composite	  measures	  of	  stringency.	  
Table	  5	  presents	  descriptive	  statistics	  for	  firms’	  stringency	  scores	  with	  the	  primary	  
(single	  unit	  increase)	  measure	  applied.	  
	  
VI.	  Empirical	  Results	  	  
Analysis	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  Clawback	  Stringency	  and	  Corporate	  Governance	  on	  
Earnings	  Management	  
	   As	  a	  starting	  point	  in	  the	  analysis,	  I	  estimate	  ordinary	  least-­‐squares	  (OLS)	  
regressions	  to	  examine	  the	  impact	  of	  clawback	  stringency	  on	  abnormal	  accruals,	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firms	  that	  adopted	  clawback	  provisions.	  I	  also	  estimate	  probit	  models	  to	  predict	  the	  
likelihood	  of	  a	  firm	  narrowly	  avoiding	  a	  loss	  or	  narrowly	  avoiding	  an	  earnings	  
decline.	  Table	  6	  describes	  the	  sample	  selection	  for	  the	  analyses	  that	  estimate	  the	  
impact	  of	  stringency	  on	  various	  measures	  of	  earnings	  management.	  Descriptive	  
statistics	  for	  the	  variables	  are	  presented	  in	  Tables	  7	  and	  8.	  Table	  9	  presents	  the	  
results	  of	  the	  regressions	  of	  abnormal	  accruals,	  percent	  total,	  accruals,	  and	  
discretionary	  revenue	  on	  the	  governance,	  clawback	  stringency,	  and	  firm	  control	  
variables.	  Table	  10	  presents	  the	  results	  for	  the	  loss	  avoidance	  regression	  and	  the	  
earnings	  decline	  avoidance	  regression.	  	  
In	  the	  abnormal	  accruals	  (loss	  avoidance)	  regressions,	  I	  find	  significant	  
negative	  coefficients	  (marginal	  effects)	  on	  STRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	  and	  
significant	  positive	  coefficients	  (marginal	  effects)	  on	  
HIGH_GOVxSTRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	  that	  are	  smaller	  than	  the	  absolute	  values	  of	  
the	  corresponding	  coefficients	  on	  the	  STRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	  variable.	  
Although	  these	  results	  only	  hold	  after	  2007	  in	  the	  abnormal	  accruals	  regression	  and	  
after	  2008	  in	  the	  loss	  avoidance	  regression,	  they	  support	  both	  H1	  and	  H2.	  In	  an	  
untabulated	  analysis,	  I	  find	  that	  the	  mean	  governance	  index	  level	  for	  initial	  adopters	  
of	  clawbacks	  steadily	  decreased	  from	  2005	  through	  2008,	  with	  the	  initial	  adopters	  
having	  much	  stronger	  governance	  than	  the	  later	  adopters.	  Although	  there	  were	  very	  
modest	  increases	  in	  the	  mean	  governance	  index	  value	  from	  2008	  to	  2009	  and	  again	  
from	  2009	  to	  2010,	  the	  mean	  levels	  during	  2009	  and	  2010	  were	  still	  considerably	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firms	  that	  adopted	  clawbacks	  later	  would	  have	  greater	  room	  for	  improvement	  in	  
their	  earnings	  quality.	  
	  In	  the	  percent	  total	  accruals	  regression,	  which	  includes	  all	  clawback	  with	  
prerequisite	  data	  available	  in	  the	  fiscal	  year	  of	  adoption,	  I	  find	  a	  statistically	  
insignificant	  coefficient	  for	  STRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT,	  but	  a	  significant	  negative	  
coefficient	  for	  LOW_GOVxSTRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT,	  indicating	  that	  increased	  
stringency	  is	  associated	  with	  lower	  earnings	  management	  only	  for	  the	  low-­‐
governance	  firms,	  but	  not	  for	  the	  high-­‐governance	  firms.	  This	  result	  supports	  H2.	  In	  
the	  discretionary	  revenue	  regression,	  both	  the	  low	  and	  high-­‐governance	  firms	  
experienced	  greater	  reductions	  in	  earnings	  management	  associated	  with	  
heightened	  clawback	  stringency.	  However,	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  
between	  the	  effects	  of	  stringency	  on	  the	  two	  groups.	  Increased	  stringency	  does	  not	  
appear	  to	  exert	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  earnings	  decline	  avoidance	  behavior	  of	  
firms	  with	  either	  low	  or	  high	  governance.	  
Overall,	  I	  generally	  find	  evidence	  that,	  for	  both	  the	  low-­‐governance	  and	  high-­‐
governance	  firms,	  increased	  stringency	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  earnings	  
management,	  and	  that	  the	  low-­‐governance	  firms	  tend	  to	  experience	  a	  greater	  
reduction	  in	  earnings	  management	  than	  the	  well-­‐governed	  firms.	  In	  summary,	  three	  
of	  the	  five	  earnings	  management	  analyses	  support	  H1	  and	  three	  support	  H2.	  The	  
one	  analysis	  that	  does	  not	  support	  either	  (earnings	  decline	  avoidance)	  requires	  a	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Consistent	  with	  expectation,	  in	  the	  abnormal	  accruals	  regression,	  LN_ROA	  
and	  DEC_INCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	  have	  positive	  coefficients.	  However,	  only	  
LN_ROA	  is	  significant.	  Surprisingly,	  SC_OPER_CASHFLOW	  has	  a	  significant	  negative	  
coefficient.	  As	  expected,	  BIG4_AUDITOR	  and	  GOV_INDEX	  have	  negative	  coefficients.	  
However,	  only	  BIG4_AUDITOR	  is	  significant.	  Contrary	  to	  expectation,	  DEMAND,	  
LEVERAGE,	  and	  CEOCOMP_MIX	  variables	  all	  have	  negative	  coefficients,	  although	  
none	  is	  significant.	  In	  the	  percent	  total	  accruals	  regression,	  all	  control	  variables	  have	  
signs	  consistent	  with	  except	  for	  FINANCE,	  which	  had	  a	  negative	  sign,	  although	  not	  
significant.	  Among	  the	  control	  variables	  whose	  signs	  follow	  expectation,	  only	  
GOV_INDEX	  is	  significant.	  The	  discretionary	  revenue	  estimation	  produced	  the	  
expected	  signs	  on	  control	  variables,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  DEMAND	  and	  
DEC_INCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	  variables,	  which	  had	  negative	  coefficients,	  and	  the	  
BIG4_AUDITOR	  variable,	  which	  had	  a	  positive	  coefficient,	  but	  none	  were	  significant.	  
In	  the	  loss	  avoidance	  regression,	  the	  marginal	  effects	  for	  
ABNORMAL_ACCRUALS,	  LEVERAGE,	  BIG4_AUDITOR,	  and	  SC_OPER_CASHFLOW	  are	  
significant	  and	  negative,	  while	  the	  marginal	  effect	  for	  
DEC_INCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	  is	  positive	  and	  significant.	  The	  signs	  on	  the	  other	  
control	  variables	  are	  not	  significant.	  Among	  them,	  however,	  DEMAND	  has	  a	  negative	  
sign,	  unexpectedly,	  while	  the	  remaining	  variables	  have	  signs	  consistent	  with	  
expectation.	  In	  the	  earnings	  decline	  avoidance	  regression,	  the	  signs	  on	  control	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<Insert	  Tables	  6,	  7,	  8,	  9,	  and	  10	  about	  here.>	   	  
Robustness	  Tests	  	  
The	  preceding	  results	  for	  the	  abnormal	  accruals,	  percent	  total	  accruals,	  and	  
discretionary	  revenue	  estimation	  models	  are	  robust	  to	  the	  Breusch-­‐Pagan	  test	  for	  
heteroskedasticity.	  In	  addition,	  all	  of	  the	  variables	  in	  the	  models	  have	  high	  tolerance	  
and	  none	  have	  a	  variance	  inflation	  factor	  larger	  than	  4.24,	  indicating	  that	  there	  is	  
low	  multicollinearity.	  	  
Alternative	  Computations	  of	  Stringency	  
	   Many	  of	  the	  earlier	  empirical	  results	  are	  virtually	  unchanged	  when	  various	  
alternative	  measures	  of	  clawback	  stringency	  are	  applied	  to	  the	  earnings	  
management	  regressions.	  I	  compute	  three	  alternative	  additive	  measures	  of	  
stringency.	  First,	  I	  compute	  stringency	  by	  adding	  two	  units	  to	  the	  score	  for	  each	  
incremental	  increase	  in	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  triggering	  and	  adding	  one	  unit	  to	  the	  
score	  for	  each	  increase	  in	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  executive	  coverage.	  This	  
approach	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  original	  computation,	  with	  the	  only	  difference	  being	  that	  
each	  elevation	  in	  the	  strictness	  of	  the	  initiation,	  triggering	  events,	  or	  sub-­‐triggers	  
adds	  two	  units	  to	  the	  total	  stringency	  score.	  The	  computation	  of	  this	  measure	  is	  
displayed	  in	  Table	  4.	  
In	  addition,	  as	  a	  further	  robustness	  test,	  I	  compute	  two	  other	  variants	  of	  the	  
stringency	  measure.	  First,	  I	  apply	  equal	  weights	  to	  all	  stringency	  attributes	  by	  taking	  
a	  firm’s	  stringency	  score	  for	  a	  given	  category,	  dividing	  it	  by	  the	  maximum	  possible	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categories.	  Finally,	  I	  compute	  stringency	  with	  twice	  as	  much	  weight	  (25%)	  applied	  
to	  each	  of	  the	  three	  triggering	  condition	  components	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  weight	  that	  
is	  applied	  (12.5%)	  to	  the	  executive	  coverage	  and	  clawback	  amount	  stringency	  
components,	  respectively.	  Again,	  similar	  to	  the	  preceding	  measure,	  the	  weights	  are	  
applied	  to	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  stringency	  score	  for	  each	  category	  to	  the	  maximum	  
potential	  stringency	  score	  for	  the	  category.	  	  
The	  results	  for	  H1	  and	  H2	  in	  the	  abnormal	  accruals	  regressions	  are	  fully	  
robust	  to	  all	  of	  the	  alternative	  measures	  of	  clawback	  stringency,	  with	  the	  exception	  
of	  a	  lack	  of	  significance	  for	  β2	  in	  the	  regression	  with	  the	  first	  alternative	  stringency	  
measure,	  which	  does	  not	  support	  H2.	  The	  percent	  total	  accruals	  regressions	  that	  use	  
the	  latter	  two	  alternative	  measures	  of	  clawback	  stringency	  (equal-­‐weighted	  
components	  and	  double-­‐weighted	  triggering	  components)	  continue	  to	  support	  H2.	  
(The	  previous	  percent	  total	  accruals	  results	  supported	  H2	  but	  not	  H1.)	  However,	  in	  
the	  regression	  with	  the	  first	  alternative	  measure	  (double	  points	  assigned	  to	  the	  
triggering	  condition	  components),	  the	  coefficient	  on	  β2	  is	  positive	  and	  smaller	  than	  
the	  absolute	  value	  of	  β1,	  although	  consistent	  with	  H2,	  is	  insignificant	  with	  a	  t-­‐
statistic	  of	  1.91.	  Thus,	  both	  the	  abnormal	  accruals	  and	  the	  percent	  total	  accruals	  
results	  are	  unchanged	  with	  (the	  latter)	  two	  of	  the	  three	  alternative	  stringency	  
measures.	  	  
Meanwhile,	  the	  previous	  discretionary	  revenue	  regression	  results	  
(supporting	  H1)	  are	  only	  robust	  to	  the	  first	  alternative	  stringency	  measure.	  (Earlier	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supporting	  H2	  in	  the	  discretionary	  revenue	  regressions,	  as	  the	  positive	  sign	  on	  β2	  
persists	  under	  all	  three	  alternative	  stringency	  computations	  and	  β2	  is	  always	  
smaller	  in	  magnitude	  than	  the	  absolute	  value	  of	  β1,	  consistent	  with	  H2,	  but	  β2	  is	  
never	  significant.	  	  
The	  loss	  avoidance	  regression	  results	  supporting	  H1	  and	  H2	  are	  only	  robust	  
to	  the	  second	  alternative	  stringency	  measure,	  although	  the	  signs	  on	  the	  coefficients	  
are	  consistent	  with	  H1	  and	  H2	  when	  using	  the	  first	  alternative	  measure	  of	  
stringency.	  Earnings	  decline	  avoidance	  results	  do	  not	  withstand	  any	  of	  the	  
alternative	  measures	  of	  stringency.	  However,	  coefficient	  estimates	  in	  both	  sets	  of	  
probit	  regressions	  may	  be	  unstable	  due	  to	  the	  small	  number	  of	  observations.	  
	   	  
Analysis	  of	  The	  Relation	  Between	  Corporate	  Governance	  Quality	  and	  
Clawback	  Stringency	  
I	  estimate	  an	  ordered	  probit	  regression	  of	  clawback	  stringency	  on	  the	  firm	  
variables,	  conditional	  on	  clawback	  adoptions.	  The	  sample	  selection	  is	  displayed	  in	  
Table	  10.	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  for	  the	  regression	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  11.	  Table	  
12	  presents	  the	  results	  from	  the	  regression.	  Column	  1	  displays	  the	  coefficient	  
estimates	  and	  Column	  2	  displays	  the	  marginal	  effects.	  This	  regression	  provides	  an	  
indication	  of	  how	  the	  various	  firm	  characteristics	  are	  associated	  with	  clawback	  
stringency.	  Consistent	  with	  H3,	  conditional	  upon	  clawback	  adoption,	  I	  find	  a	  positive	  
marginal	  effect	  for	  corporate	  governance	  quality,	  when	  explaining	  stringency,	  as	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The	  lack	  of	  significance	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  much	  more	  limited	  variation	  in	  the	  
governance	  index	  when	  conditioning	  on	  both	  firms	  that	  adopt	  clawbacks.	  In	  
addition,	  the	  stringency	  decision	  itself	  may	  be	  more	  of	  an	  idiosyncratic	  board	  
decision	  once	  it	  is	  a	  given	  that	  a	  firm	  adopts	  a	  clawback	  provision.	  The	  signs	  for	  the	  
marginal	  effects	  on	  all	  control	  variables	  are	  consistent	  with	  expectation,	  with	  the	  
exception	  of	  the	  following	  variables:	  GOODWILL_IMPAIR_LAG1,	  FINANCE,	  and	  
GOV_INDEX_LAG1xINCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI.	  These	  variables	  all	  have	  negative	  
marginal	  effects.	  However,	  none	  is	  statistically	  significant.	  
CAPITAL_INTENSITY_LAG1	  has	  a	  significant	  negative	  marginal	  effect	  and	  
INDUSTRY_AVERAGE_RDTOSALE_LAG1	  has	  a	  significant	  positive	  marginal	  effect,	  but	  
the	  signs	  on	  the	  other	  variables	  are	  statistically	  insignificant.	  Interestingly,	  none	  of	  
the	  189	  firms	  that	  adopted	  clawbacks	  and	  had	  the	  prerequisite	  data	  available	  for	  the	  
ordered	  probit	  stringency	  determinants	  model	  experienced	  restatements	  during	  
2000	  through	  2004	  or	  frauds	  between	  1995	  and	  2006	  and	  none	  of	  the	  286	  
identified	  voluntary	  adopters	  had	  CEO	  and	  chairman	  duality.	  Thus,	  those	  three	  
variables	  dropped	  out	  of	  the	  model,	  and	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  adopting	  firms	  in	  the	  
sample	  have	  a	  preventive	  motivation	  for	  adopting,	  rather	  than	  a	  corrective	  one.	  It	  
also	  appears	  that	  the	  executives	  of	  firms	  where	  there	  is	  CEO	  and	  Chairman	  duality	  
can	  successfully	  block	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  clawback	  provision.	  	  
Table	  12	  also	  provides	  descriptive	  statistics	  comparing	  the	  low	  and	  high-­‐
stringency	  adopting	  firms.	  The	  means	  for	  most	  of	  the	  variables	  are	  quite	  similar.	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stronger	  capital	  market	  incentives,	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  variable	  FINANCE,	  and	  a	  
greater	  proportion	  of	  the	  high-­‐stringency	  firms	  are	  financial	  firms	  as	  compared	  to	  
the	  low-­‐stringency	  firms.	  On	  average,	  the	  high-­‐stringency	  firms	  also	  have	  modestly	  
higher	  goodwill	  impairments	  and	  capital	  intensity.	  However,	  the	  low-­‐stringency	  
firms	  have	  a	  higher	  mean	  governance	  index,	  percentage	  of	  CEO	  compensation	  that	  is	  
incentive-­‐based,	  CEO	  turnover,	  asset	  base,	  industry-­‐average	  R&D-­‐to-­‐sales,	  firm	  age,	  
and	  composition	  of	  utility	  firms.	  Overall,	  the	  two	  groups	  are	  quite	  similar.	  
<Insert	  Tables	  11,	  12,	  and	  13	  about	  here.>	  
Econometric	  Techniques	  for	  Self-­‐Selection	  into	  Clawback	  Stringency	   	  
	   Although,	  conditional	  on	  clawback	  adoption,	  there	  is	  not	  a	  significant	  
association	  between	  clawback	  stringency	  and	  firms’	  pre-­‐existing	  corporate	  
governance	  quality,	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  other	  firm	  characteristics	  are	  
significant	  determinants	  of	  clawback	  stringency.	  Therefore,	  I	  apply	  the	  Heckman	  2-­‐
Stage	  Approach	  where	  possible	  to	  investigate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  selection	  bias	  is	  
present.	  In	  the	  untabulated	  analyses,	  I	  find	  no	  evidence	  that	  any	  of	  the	  inverse	  Mills	  
ratios	  are	  significant.29	  Thus,	  I	  conclude	  that	  any	  selection	  bias	  present	  does	  not	  
appear	  to	  exert	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  coefficients	  in	  the	  earnings	  management	  
regressions.	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VII.	  Conclusion	  
	   In	  conclusion,	  this	  paper	  presents	  some	  evidence	  that	  increased	  clawback	  
stringency	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  greater	  deterrent	  effect	  for	  both	  weakly	  governed	  
and	  well-­‐governed	  firms,	  supporting	  H1.	  However,	  this	  study	  demonstrates,	  that	  in	  
several	  cases,	  the	  deterrent	  effect	  is	  attenuated	  for	  firms	  with	  stronger	  antecedent	  
corporate	  governance,	  consistent	  with	  H2.	  Thus,	  an	  implicit	  finding	  is	  that	  the	  
weakly	  governed	  firms	  appear	  to	  have	  implemented	  sufficiently	  credible	  clawbacks	  
to	  actually	  realize	  a	  deterrent	  effect.	  Importantly,	  however,	  this	  study	  also	  
demonstrates	  that	  clawbacks	  cannot	  be	  expected	  to	  produce	  a	  uniform	  deterrent	  
effect,	  thus,	  DF	  clawbacks	  may	  not	  have	  the	  anticipated	  deterrent	  effect	  for	  firms	  of	  
all	  (governance)	  types.	  Among	  firms	  that	  voluntarily	  adopt	  clawback	  provisions,	  the	  
clawback	  stringency	  decision	  is	  not	  systematically	  related	  to	  the	  firm	  characteristics	  
examined,	  other	  than	  capital	  intensity	  and	  industry	  average	  R&D-­‐to	  sales,	  which	  
have	  been	  demonstrated	  by	  Berry	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  to	  be	  antecedents	  of	  corporate	  
governance.	  Although	  I	  do	  not	  find	  a	  significant	  positive	  association	  between	  
clawback	  stringency	  and	  corporate	  governance	  quality,	  I	  do	  find	  strong	  evidence	  
that	  the	  adopting	  firms	  are	  generally	  firms	  with	  superior	  governance,	  as	  none	  of	  the	  
adopting	  firms	  had	  duality	  of	  the	  CEO	  and	  Board	  Chairman	  positions	  during	  the	  
fiscal	  year	  of	  or	  prior	  to	  clawback	  adoption.	  This	  latter	  result,	  coupled	  with	  the	  
documented	  deterrence	  effects	  of	  stringency,	  provides	  support	  for	  a	  need	  for	  
regulation	  such	  as	  that	  proposed	  by	  DF.	  However,	  DF	  only	  sets	  a	  floor	  for	  the	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23%	  of	  firms)	  voluntarily	  implemented	  clawbacks	  at	  least	  as	  stringent	  as	  the	  
proposed	  DF	  clawback,	  and	  approximately	  12%	  of	  firms	  in	  the	  sample	  instituted	  
more	  stringent	  clawbacks.	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Figure	  1:	  Conceptual	  Illustration	  of	  Clawbacks,	  Governance,	  and	  Financial	  
Reporting
Ex	  Ante	  Firm	  Financial	  Reporting	  
Characteristics	  
-­‐Earnings	  quality	  
-­‐Past	  history	  of	  frauds,	  restatements	  
-­‐ETC.	  
Noisy	  first-­‐period	  signal	  to	  agent	  about	  
future	  board	  discipline	  and	  the	  
probability	  and	  magnitude	  of	  adverse	  
consequences	  (punishment)	  for	  
engaging	  in	  earnings	  management	  
Principal	  (Board)	  chooses	  
sharing	  rule,	  anticipating	  
agent’s	  response.	  This	  includes	  
a	  compensation	  structure	  
choice	  and	  a	  decision	  of	  
whether	  or	  not	  to	  implement	  a	  
clawback	  and,	  if	  implemented,	  








The	  structure	  of	  the	  clawback	  provision	  or	  lack	  of	  existence	  of	  one	  establishes	  the	  
credibility	  of	  an	  ex	  post	  compensation	  adjustment	  and	  its	  likely	  magnitude.	  
	  
Level	  of	  Potential	  for	  
Improvement	  in	  Financial	  
Reporting	  Quality	  
Level	  of	  Earnings	  Management	  Activity	  
	  
Agent	  chooses	  effort	  level	  and	  a	  vector	  of	  financial	  reporting	  decisions,	  conditional	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Table	  1	  
Defining	  Features	  of	  Clawback	  Provisions	  	  
	  
Triggering	  Conditions	  
• Initiation:	  whether	  a	  board	  is	  obligated	  to	  pursue	  a	  recovery	  versus	  can	  
pursue	  one	  at	  its	  will	  
• Events:	  use	  of	  inaccurate	  operating	  metrics,	  financial	  misstatement,	  
financial	  restatement	  
• Behaviors:	  misconduct	  (intentional	  “bad	  behavior”),	  negligence	  
• Personal	  Responsibility:	  required	  or	  not	  required	  
Amount	  of	  Clawback	  
• Full	  bonus	  or	  incentive	  compensation	  
• Excess	  bonus	  or	  incentive	  compensation	  
• Excess	  plus	  some	  additional	  amount,	  subject	  to	  discretion	  	  
Executive	  Coverage	  
• All	  executives	  
• Sub-­‐set	  of	  executives:	  specific	  named	  individuals	  
Pay	  Type	  Coverage	  
• All	  pay	  types	  
• Sub-­‐set	  of	  pay	  types:	  i.e.	  cash	  bonus,	  or	  options	  only	  
Asymmetric	  or	  Symmetric	  Recovery	  
• Asymmetric	  Recovery:	  permits	  only	  the	  company	  to	  recover	  from	  the	  
executive	  
• Symmetric	  Recovery:	  also	  allows	  executive	  to	  recover	  from	  the	  
company	  if	  it	  is	  later	  determined	  that	  the	  bonus	  or	  incentive	  
compensation	  was	  under-­‐paid.	  
Length	  of	  the	  Recovery	  Period	  
• Look-­‐back	  Period:	  how	  far	  back	  a	  company	  looks	  back	  in	  time	  from	  a	  
specified	  date,	  for	  purposes	  of	  computing	  the	  recovery	  amount	  
• Forward-­‐Looking	  Period:	  how	  far	  forward	  a	  company	  looks	  in	  time	  
from	  a	  specified	  date,	  for	  purposes	  of	  computing	  the	  recovery	  amount	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Table	  2	  	  
Control	  Variables	  Used	  in	  the	  Estimation	  	  
Of	  the	  Effects	  of	  Clawback	  Stringency	  
	  
Control	  Variable	   Definition	  
LEVERAGE	   Ratio	  of	  the	  sum	  of	  current	  assets	  and	  long-­‐term	  debt	  divided	  by	  
total	  assets	  
FINANCE	   1	  if	  a	  firm’s	  percentage	  change	  in	  long-­‐term	  debt	  is	  greater	  than	  
or	  equal	  to	  20%	  or	  its	  percentage	  change	  in	  common	  shares	  
outstanding	  is	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  10%.	  
SALES	  GROWTH	   Percentage	  change	  in	  sales	  
LN_ROA	   Natural	  logarithm	  of	  the	  ratio	  of	  net	  income	  to	  assets	  lagged	  to	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  prior	  fiscal	  year.	  
SC_OPER_CASH_FLOW	   Ratio	  of	  net	  operating	  cash	  flow	  scaled	  by	  total	  assets	  
BIG4_AUDITOR	   1	  if	  firm	  employed	  a	  Big	  4	  auditor,	  0	  otherwise	  
DEMAND	   Dechow	  et.	  al.	  (1996)	  Ex-­‐Ante	  Measure	  of	  Demand	  for	  External	  
Financing.	  Computed	  as	  the	  change	  in	  the	  following:	  cash	  from	  
operations	  in	  the	  period	  t-­‐1,	  less	  average	  capital	  expenditures	  in	  
periods	  t-­‐4	  to	  t-­‐2,	  all	  divided	  by	  current	  assets	  in	  period	  t-­‐2,	  
where	  year	  t	  is	  the	  fiscal	  year	  of	  the	  first	  clawback	  adoption	  for	  
the	  sample.	  
GOVERNANCE_INDEX	   Follows	  definition	  above	  in	  Table	  3.	  	  
EXECUTIVE_TURNOVER	   1	  if	  there	  was	  a	  change	  in	  CEO,	  0	  otherwise	  
CEOCOMP_MIX	   The	  percentage	  of	  total	  CEO	  compensation	  that	  is	  non-­‐salary-­‐
based	  
DEC_INCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	   The	  decile	  rank	  of	  the	  dollar	  value	  of	  the	  CEO’s	  total	  incentive	  
compensation,	  scaled	  by	  net	  income,	  as	  compared	  to	  all	  other	  
firms	  with	  available	  data	  in	  Compustat.	  
FINANCIAL_FIRM	   1	  if	  the	  firm	  is	  a	  financial	  institution,	  0	  otherwise.	  Financial	  
institutions	  are	  firms	  that	  have	  a	  2-­‐digit	  Standard	  Industrial	  
Classification	  (SIC)	  Code	  between	  60	  and	  69,	  inclusive.	  
UTIL_FIRM	   1	  if	  the	  firm	  is	  a	  utility	  company,	  0	  otherwise.	  Companies	  that	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Table	  3	  	  
Predictor	  Variables	  for	  the	  Stringency	  Selection	  Model	  
	  
Variable	   Definition	  
GOV_INDEX_LAG1	   Similar	  to	  ACY	  (2011)	  governance	  index.	  An	  additive	  
measure	  designed	  by	  ACY	  (2011)	  to	  capture	  the	  extent	  of	  
independent	  monitoring	  over	  management.	  This	  index	  
that	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  following	  components:	  (1)	  .33	  
multiplied	  by	  the	  quartile	  rank	  proportion	  of	  independent	  
directors,	  (2)	  cumulative	  voting,	  and	  (3)	  secret	  ballots,	  
and	  subtracting	  (4)	  .33	  multiplied	  by	  the	  quartile	  rank	  of	  
inside	  ownership,	  (5)	  whether	  the	  CEO	  is	  also	  the	  Chair,	  
(6)	  whether	  the	  company	  is	  listed	  as	  a	  family	  business,	  (7)	  
whether	  there	  are	  dual	  classes	  of	  common	  equity,	  (8)	  
whether	  there	  is	  supermajority	  voting,	  (9)	  whether	  a	  
company	  has	  a	  provision	  that	  limits	  amendments	  to	  the	  
bylaws,	  (10),	  whether	  a	  company	  has	  a	  provision	  that	  
limits	  amendments	  to	  the	  charter,	  and	  (11)	  and	  whether	  
there	  is	  unequal	  voting.	  Note:	  each	  of	  the	  above	  binary	  
items	  adds	  or	  subtracts	  one	  unit	  from	  the	  index,	  as	  
applicable,	  if	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  binary	  item	  is	  “yes”.	  	  I	  
measure	  this	  index	  as	  of	  the	  fiscal	  year	  prior	  to	  clawback	  
adoption.	  
CEOCHAIR_DUALITY_LAG1	   1	  if	  the	  CEO	  also	  chairs	  the	  board	  of	  directors,	  0	  
otherwise,	  measured	  as	  of	  the	  fiscal	  year	  prior	  to	  
clawback	  adoption.	  
CEO_TURNOVER_LAG1	   This	  variable	  is	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  there	  was	  a	  change	  in	  CEO	  in	  
the	  fiscal	  year	  prior	  to	  clawback	  adoption,	  0	  otherwise.	  
Alternatively,	  I	  measure	  CEO	  turnover	  during	  the	  fiscal	  
year	  of	  clawback	  adoption.	  CEO	  turnover	  is	  not	  significant	  
in	  either	  specification.	  
NOISE_LAG1	   Standard	  deviation	  of	  abnormal	  accruals	  in	  the	  five	  fiscal	  
years	  leading	  up	  to,	  but	  not	  including,	  the	  fiscal	  year	  of	  
clawback	  adoption.	  The	  abnormal	  accruals	  are	  measured	  
following	  the	  Modified	  Jones	  Model	  as	  modified	  by	  
Dechow	  et	  al.	  (1995).	  Similar	  to	  McNichols	  (2002)	  and	  
Francis	  et	  al.	  (2005),	  I	  include	  revenue	  growth	  and	  
property,	  plant,	  and	  equipment	  (PPE)	  in	  the	  model.	  I	  also	  
incorporate	  the	  Ball	  and	  Shivakumar	  (2006)	  nonlinear	  
adjustment.	  	  
EM_EASE_LAG1	   Median	  abnormal	  accruals	  during	  the	  five	  fiscal	  years	  
leading	  up	  to	  the	  fiscal	  year	  of	  clawback	  adoption	  
RESTATEMENT_EVER	   Slight	  modification	  of	  the	  ACY	  (2011)	  definition:	  1	  if	  the	  
firm	  had	  a	  restatement	  during	  the	  year	  1999	  through	  
2005	  as	  identified	  by	  the	  GAO	  Reports,	  0	  otherwise.	  	  
FRAUD_EVER	   1	  if	  the	  firm	  had	  a	  publicly	  known	  accounting	  fraud	  during	  
or	  after	  1998	  and	  prior	  to	  2007,	  0	  otherwise.	  I	  add	  this	  to	  
supplement	  ACY	  (2011).	  
LN_ASSET_LAG1	   Natural	  logarithm	  of	  total	  assets,	  lagged	  from	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  fiscal	  prior	  to	  the	  fiscal	  year	  of	  clawback	  adoption.	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Table	  3	  (continued)	  
GOODWILL_IMPAIR_LAG1	   Follows	  Brown	  et	  al.	  (2011):	  “An	  indicator	  variable	  that	  is	  
equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  firm	  has	  reported	  goodwill	  impairment	  
loss	  following	  the	  M&A(s)	  during	  the	  period	  from	  fiscal	  
year	  t-­‐5	  to	  t-­‐1,	  and	  0	  otherwise”.	  This	  variable	  is	  
evaluated	  as	  of	  the	  fiscal	  year	  prior	  to	  clawback	  adoption.	  
CEOCOMP_MIX_LAG1	   Percentage	  of	  total	  CEO	  compensation	  that	  is	  non-­‐salary,	  
measured	  as	  of	  the	  fiscal	  year	  of	  clawback	  adoption.	  
GOV_INDEXxINCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	   The	  ratio	  of	  the	  CEO’s	  total	  incentive	  compensation,	  
scaled	  by	  net	  income	  for	  the	  current	  fiscal	  year	  interacted	  
with	  a	  firm’s	  governance	  index	  score.	  
FINANCIAL_FIRM	   1	  if	  the	  firm	  is	  a	  financial	  institution,	  0	  otherwise.	  
Financial	  institutions	  are	  firms	  that	  have	  a	  2-­‐digit	  
Standard	  Industrial	  Classification	  (SIC)	  Code	  between	  60	  
and	  69,	  inclusive.	  
UTIL_FIRM	   1	  if	  the	  firm	  is	  a	  utility	  company,	  0	  otherwise.	  Companies	  
that	  have	  a	  2-­‐digit	  SIC	  Code	  between	  48	  and	  50,	  inclusive,	  
are	  utility	  companies.	  
FINANCE	  
Equal	  to1	  if	  a	  firm’s	  percentage	  change	  in	  long-­‐term	  debt	  
is	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  20%	  or	  its	  percentage	  change	  
in	  common	  shares	  outstanding	  is	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  
10%.	  
CAPITAL_INTENSITY_LAG1	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Table	  4	  
Clawback	  Stringency	  Measure	  (Alternative	  Scoring	  Schemes)	  
	  
Category	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Equal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Double	  
Initiation	   	   	  
Automatic:	  Board/comp	  committee	  must	  initiate	   2	   4	  
Not	  Automatic:	  Board/comp	  committee	  may	  initiate	   1	   2	  
No	  Clawback	  Provision	   0	   0	  
	  
Triggering	  Events	   	   	  
Use	  of	  an	  Inaccurate	  Operating	  Metric	  	   5	   10	  
Financial	  Misstatement	   4	   8	  
Financial	  Misstatement	  w/	  Materiality	  Threshold	   3	   6	  
Financial	  Restatement	   2	   4	  
Financial	  Restatement	  w/	  Materiality	  Threshold	   1	   2	  
No	  Clawback	  Provision	   0	   0	  
	  
Sub-­‐Triggers	   	   	  
No	  Behavioral	  Requirement	   5	   10	  
Negligence	   4	   8	  
Negligence	  w/	  Personal	  Responsibility	  Required	   3	   6	  
Some	  type	  of	  intentional	  bad	  behavior	  required	  (i.e.	  
misconduct)	  
2	   4	  
Some	  type	  of	  intentional	  bad	  behavior	  w/	  Personal	  Resp.	  
Required	  
1	   2	  
No	  Clawback	  Provision	   0	   0	  
	  
Amount	  of	  Clawback	   	   	  
Full	  Amount	  Automatic	   3	   3	  
At	  least	  the	  Excess	  and	  Possibly	  More,	  with	  Potential	  for	  Full	   2	   2	  
Only	  Excess	  Amount	   1	   1	  
No	  Clawback	  Provision	   0	   0	  
	  
Executive	  Coverage	   	   	  
All	  participants	  or	  all	  Executives30	   2	   2	  
Some	  Sub-­‐set	  of	  Executives,	  i.e.	  CEO	  and/or	  CFO	   1	   1	  
No	  Clawback	  Provision	   0	   0	  
	  
Potential	  Range	  for	  Above	  Index:	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  5-­‐17	  	   	  	  	  	  8-­‐29	  
Range	  of	  Stringency	  Given	  Provision:	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (13	  potential	  levels)	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TABLE	  5	  
DESCRIPTIVE	  STATISTICS	  FOR	  CLAWBACK	  	  
STRINGENCY	  COMPONENTS	  
	  

































INITIATION	   1.075	   0.263	   1	   1	   2	   2	   2	  
TRIGGERING_EVENTS	   1.974	   0.832	   1	   2	   5	   2	   5	  
SUB_TRIGGERS	   2.455	   1.747	   1	   1	   5	   5	   5	  
AMOUNTS	   1.944	   0.735	   1	   2	   3	   1	   1	  
EXEC_COVERAGE	   1.836	   0.371	   1	   2	   2	   2	   2	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TABLE	  6	  
SAMPLE	  SELECTION	  FOR	  
EARNINGS	  MANAGEMENT	  MODELS	  
	  
Panel	  A:	  Abnormal	  Accruals,	  Percent	  Total	  Accruals,	  and	  Discretionary	  Revenue	  Regressions	  (Firm	  observations)	   	  












	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	  
1.	  Voluntary	  Clawback	  Firms	  Identified	   286	  	   286	  	   286	  	  
Minus:	  Observations	  prior	  to	  cut-­‐off	  date	   108	  	   0	  	   0	  	  
2.	  Voluntary	  Clawback	  Firms	  in	  Sample	  Window	   178	  	   286	  	   286	  	  
Minus:	  Firms	  with	  missing	  Execucomp	  data	   25	  	   80	  	   41	  	  
3.	  Data	  after	  deleting	  firms	  missing	  Execucomp	  values	   153	  	   206	  	   245	  	  
Minus:	  Firms	  with	  missing	  data	  for	  the	  dependent	  variable	   34	  	   18	  	   0	  	  
4.	  Data	  with	  the	  prerequisite	  data	  for	  the	  dependent	  variable	   119	  	   188	   245	  	  
Minus:	  Firms	  with	  other	  missing	  financial	  Data	   23	  	   0	  	   48	  	  
5.	  Data	  with	  dependent	  variable	  and	  all	  financial	  control	  variables	   96	  	   188	  	   197	  	  
Minus:	  Firms	  with	  Missing	  Governance	  Data	   0	  	   3	  	   0	  	  
6.	  Data	  with	  dependent	  variable,	  all	  financial	  control	  variables,	  and	  all	  
governance	  data	  
96	  	   185	  	   197	  	  
Minus:	  Firms	  with	  insufficient	  detail	  to	  code	  stringency	   3	  	   9	  	   8	  	  
7.	  Final	  Sample:	  firms	  for	  which	  all	  data	  is	  available,	  including	  
stringency	  
93	  	   176	   189	  	  
	   	   	   	  
	  (1)	  This	  regression	  allows	  each	  clawback-­‐adopting	  firm	  to	  enter	  the	  regression	  once	  after	  fiscal	  year	  2007.	   	  
	  (2)	  This	  regression	  includes	  all	  clawback	  adoptions	  for	  which	  prerequisite	  data	  are	  available	   	   	  
	  (3)	  This	  regression	  includes	  all	  clawback	  adoptions	  for	  which	  prerequisite	  data	  are	  available	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
Panel	  B:	  Loss	  Avoidance	  and	  Earnings	  Decline	  Avoidance	  Models	  (Firm-­‐year	  observations)	   	   	  




	   	   (1)	   (2)	  
1.	  Voluntary	  Clawback	  Firms	  Identified	   	   864	  	   864	  	  
Minus:	  Observations	  prior	  to	  cut-­‐off	  date	   	   322	  	   322	  	  
2.	  Voluntary	  Clawback	  Firms	  in	  Sample	  Window	   	   542	  	   542	  	  
Minus:	  Firms	  with	  missing	  Execucomp	  data	   	   93	  	   93	  	  
3.	  Data	  after	  deleting	  firms	  missing	  Execucomp	  values	   	   449	  	   449	  	  
Minus:	  Firms	  with	  missing	  data	  for	  the	  dependent	  variable	   	   0	  	   0	  	  
4.	  Data	  with	  the	  prerequisite	  data	  for	  the	  dependent	  variable	   	   449	  	   449	  	  
Minus:	  Firms	  with	  other	  missing	  financial	  Data	   	   100	  	   100	  	  
5.	  Data	  with	  dependent	  variable	  and	  all	  financial	  control	  variables	   	   349	  	   349	  	  
Minus:	  Firms	  with	  Missing	  Governance	  Data	   	   17	  	   0	  	  
6.	  Data	  with	  dependent	  variable,	  all	  financial	  control	  variables,	  and	  all	  governance	  
data	  
	   332	  	   349	  	  
Minus:	  Firms	  with	  insufficient	  detail	  to	  code	  stringency	   	   0	  	   17	  	  
7.	  Final	  Sample:	  firms	  for	  which	  all	  data	  is	  available,	  including	  stringency	   	   332	  	   332	  	  
	   	   	   	  
	  (1)	  This	  regression	  includes	  all	  firm-­‐year	  clawback	  observations	  after	  2008	  for	  which	  prerequisite	  data	  are	  available.	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Table	  7	  
Descriptive	  Statistics	  for	  Earnings	  Management	  Models	  
	  
Panel	  A:	  Abnormal	  Accruals	  Model	  (93	  firm	  observations)	  
	  
Variable	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
ABNORMAL_ACCRUALS	   0.028	   0.045	   -­‐0.101	   0.151	  
STRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   9.301	   2.084	   6	   15	  
DEMAND	   0.241	   0.228	   -­‐0.298	   1.159	  
LEVERAGE	   0.637	   0.180	   0.233	   1.136	  
LN_ROA	   2.796	   0.809	   -­‐5.142	   -­‐1.067	  
SC_OPERCASHFLOW	   0.132	   0.066	   -­‐0.002	   0.379	  
BIG4_AUDITOR	   0.968	   0.178	   0	   1	  
GOV_INDEX	   0.031	   0.766	   -­‐2.32	   0.99	  
CEOCOMP_MIX	   0.836	   0.100	   0.425	   0.971	  
DEC_INCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	   6.720	   2.213	   2	   10	  
HIGH_GOVxSTRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   14.065	   6.000	   6	   24	  
UTIL_FIRM	   0.129	   0.337	   0	   1	  
	  
	  
Panel	  B:	  Percent	  Total	  Accruals	  Model	  (176	  firm	  observations)	  
	  
Variable	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
PERCENT_TOTAL_ACCRUALS	   0.271	   1.179	   -­‐5.525	   5.483	  
STRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   9.352	   2.023	   6	   15	  
FINANCE	   0.267	   0.444	   0	   1	  
GOV_INDEX	   0.130	   0.729	   -­‐2.32	   0.99	  
BIG4_AUDITOR	   0.977	   0.149	   0	   1	  
SALES_GROWTH	   0.055	   0.230	   -­‐0.369	   2.387	  
DEC_INCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	   6.324	   2.398	   2	   10	  
EXEC_TURNOVER	   0.080	   0.271	   0	   1	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Table	  8	  
Descriptive	  Statistics	  for	  Earnings	  Management	  Models	  
	  
Panel	  C:	  Discretionary	  Revenue	  Model	  (189	  firm	  observations)	  
	  
Variable	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
SC_DISC_REVENUE	   -­‐0.005	   0.027	   -­‐0.144	   0.082	  
STRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   9.280	   2.027	   6	   15	  
BIG4_AUDITOR	   0.979	   0.144	   0	   1	  
DEMAND	   0.234	   0.238	   -­‐0.587	   1.159	  
GOV_INDEX	   0.143	   0.721	   -­‐2.32	   0.99	  
CEOCOMP_MIX	   0.831	   0.112	   0.352	   1	  
DEC_INCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	   5.582	   2.834	   1	   10	  
FINANCIAL_FIRM	   0.005	   0.073	   0	   1	  
HIGH_GOVxSTRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   14.344	   5.762	   6	   26	  
	  
Panel	  D:	  Loss	  Avoidance	  Model	  (332	  firm-­‐year	  observations)	  
	  
Variable	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
LOSS_AVOID	   0.039	   0.194	   0	   1	  
STRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   9.301	   2.058	   6	   15	  
ABNORMAL_ACCRUALS	   0.006	   0.070	   -­‐0.587	   0.517	  
LEVERAGE	   0.603	   0.181	   0.106	   1.218	  
SC_OPER_CASHFLOW	   0.118	   0.078	   -­‐0.116	   0.479	  
BIG4_AUDITOR	   0.979	   0.144	   0	   1	  
GOV_INDEX	   0.385	   0.632	   -­‐1.66	   0.99	  
CEOCOMP_MIX	   0.836	   0.105	   0.365	   1	  
DEC_INCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	   5.401	   2.855	   1	   10	  
FINANCE	   0.241	   0.428	   0	   1	  
HIGH_GOVxSTRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   15.771	   5.454	   6	   30	  
	  
Panel	  E:	  Earnings	  Decline	  Avoidance	  (332	  firm-­‐year	  observations)	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Variable	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
DECLINE_AVOID	   0.145	   0.352	   0	   1	  
STRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   9.301	   2.058	   6	   15	  
ABNORMAL_ACCRUALS	   0.006	   0.070	   -­‐0.587	   0.517	  
LEVERAGE	   0.603	   0.181	   0.106	   1.218	  
SC_OPER_CASHFLOW	   0.118	   0.078	   -­‐0.116	   0.479	  
BIG4_AUDITOR	   0.979	   0.144	   0	   1	  
HIGH_GOVxSTRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   0.385	   0.632	   -­‐1.66	   0.99	  
CEOCOMP_MIX	   0.836	   0.105	   0.365	   1	  
DEC_INCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	   5.401	   2.855	   1	   10	  
FINANCE	   0.241	   0.428	   0	   1	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TABLE	  9	  
OLS	  REGRESSIONS	  ESTIMATING	  THE	  IMPACT	  
OF	  CLAWBACK	  STRINGENCY	  ON	  EARNINGS	  MANAGEMENT	  
WITH	  ALL	  STRINGENCY	  COMPONENTS	  ADDING	  ONE	  UNIT	  
	  
















	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	  
STRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   -­‐0.005*	   0.089	   -­‐0.002*	  	  	  
	   (-­‐2.30)	   1.85	   (-­‐2.30)	  	  	  	  
HIGH_GOVxSTRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   0.003*	   	   0.001	  
	   2.08	   	   0.91	  
LOW_GOVxSTRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   	   -­‐0.088*	   	  
	   	   (-­‐2.51)	   	  
DEMAND	   -­‐0.011	   	   -­‐0.008	  
	   (-­‐0.54)	   	   (-­‐0.99)	  	  	  	  
FINANCE	   	   -­‐0.337	   	  
	   	   (-­‐1.67)	   	  
LEVERAGE	   -­‐0.041	   	   	  
	   (-­‐1.69)	   	   	  
LN_ROA	   0.04***	   	   	  
	   5.37	   	   	  
SALES_GROWTH	   	   0.209	   	  
	   	   0.54	   	  
SC_OPER_CASHFLOW	   -­‐0.34***	   	   	  
	   (-­‐4.22)	   	   	  
BIG4_AUDITOR	   -­‐0.047*	   -­‐0.289	   0.022	  
	   (-­‐2.15)	   (-­‐0.48)	   1.7	  
GOV_INDEX	   -­‐0.018	   -­‐0.628**	   -­‐0.003	  
	   (-­‐1.87)	   (-­‐2.73)	   (-­‐0.68)	  	  	  	  
CEOCOMP_MIX	   -­‐0.006	   	   0.022	  
	   (-­‐0.14)	   	   1.19	  
DEC_INCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	   0	   0.001	   -­‐0.001	  
	   0.14	   0.04	   (-­‐1.33)	  	  	  	  
UTIL_FIRM	   -­‐0.02	   	   	  
	   (-­‐1.52)	   	   	  
FINANCIAL_FIRM	   	   	   -­‐0.124***	  
	   	   	   (-­‐4.74)	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Table	  9	  (continued)	  
	  
EXEC_TURNOVER	  









	   	  
-­‐0.019	  
	   5.41	   	   (-­‐0.95)	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	  
N	   93	   176	   189	  
Adjusted-­‐R2	   0.349	   0.027	   0.141	  






*	  p<0.05;	  **	  p<0.01;***	  p<0.001	  
	  
Variable	  Definitions:	  
	  (1)	  ABNORMAL_ACCRUALS	  =	  Abnormal	  accruals	  computed	  from	  the	  Modified	  Jones	  Model	  as	  
modified	  by	  Dechow	  et	  al.	  (1995)	  with	  the	  McNichols	  (2002)	  and	  Francis	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  revenue	  
growth	  and	  property,	  plant,	  and	  equipment	  (PPE)	  adjustments	  and	  the	  Ball	  and	  Shivakumar	  (2006)	  
non-­‐linear	  adjustment	  
(2)	  PERCENT	  TOTAL	  ACCRUALS	  =	  Net	  income	  less	  the	  sum	  of	  net	  dividends	  and	  distributions	  to	  and	  
from	  equity-­‐holders	  and	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  cash	  balance,	  scaled	  by	  the	  absolute	  value	  of	  net	  income	  
(3)	  DISCRETIONARY	  REVENUE=	  Stubben	  (2011)	  measure	  of	  discretionary	  revenue,	  scaled	  by	  lagged	  
total	  assets	  from	  the	  prior	  fiscal	  year.	  
STRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	  	  =	  A	  firm’s	  stringency	  score.	  
HIGH_GOVxSTRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	  	  =	  Dummy	  variable	  for	  high	  governance	  interacted	  with	  
stringency.	  
LOW_GOVxSTRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	  =	  Dummy	  variable	  for	  low	  governance	  
DEMAND	  =	  Dechow	  and	  Dichev	  (1996)	  measure	  of	  ex	  ante	  demand	  for	  external	  financing.	  
FINANCE	  =	  1	  if	  a	  firm	  had	  a	  change	  in	  long-­‐term	  debt	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  20%	  or	  a	  change	  in	  
common	  shares	  outstanding	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  10%.	  
LEVERAGE	  =	  (Total	  current	  assets	  plus	  long-­‐term	  debt),	  scaled	  by	  total	  assets.	  
LN_ROA	  =	  natural	  logarithm	  of	  the	  ratio	  of	  net	  income	  to	  total	  end-­‐of-­‐fiscal	  year	  assets	  
SALES_GROWTH	  =	  Percentage	  change	  in	  sales	  revenue	  from	  the	  prior	  fiscal	  year	  
SC_OPER_CASHFLOW	  =	  Net	  cash	  flow	  from	  operations,	  scaled	  by	  lagged	  total	  assets.	  
BIG4_AUDITOR	  =	  1	  if	  the	  firm	  employed	  a	  Big	  4	  auditor	  during	  the	  fiscal	  year.	  
GOV_INDEX	  =	  Value	  of	  the	  governance	  index.	  
CEOCOMP_MIX	  =	  Percentage	  of	  a	  CEO’s	  total	  SEC-­‐reported	  compensation	  that	  was	  incentive-­‐based.	  
DEC_INCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	  =	  The	  decile	  rank	  of	  the	  dollar	  value	  of	  the	  CEO’s	  total	  incentive	  
compensation,	  scaled	  by	  net	  income,	  as	  compared	  to	  all	  other	  firms	  with	  available	  data	  in	  Compustat.	  
UTIL_FIRM	  =	  1	  if	  a	  firm	  has	  a	  2-­‐digit	  SIC	  Code	  between	  48	  and	  50,	  inclusive.	  
FINANCIAL_FIRM	  =	  1	  if	  a	  firm	  has	  a	  2-­‐digit	  SIC	  Code	  between	  60	  and	  69,	  inclusive.	  
EXEC_TURNOVER	  =	  1	  if	  a	  firm	  experienced	  a	  change	  in	  CEO	  during	  the	  fiscal	  year.
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Table	  10	  
Loss	  Avoidance	  and	  Earnings	  Decline	  Avoidance	  Probit	  Regressions	  
	  


















	   (Z-­‐statistic)	   (Z-­‐statistic)	   (Z-­‐statistic)	   (Z-­‐statistic)	  
STRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   -­‐0.839*	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.042	   -­‐0.009	  
	   (-­‐2.45)	   (-­‐2.45)	   (-­‐0.43)	   (-­‐0.43)	  	  	  	  
HIGH_GOVxSTRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   0.46*	   0.000*	   0.046	   0.01	  
	   2.49	   2.49	   0.98	   0.99	  
ABNORMAL_ACCRUALS	   -­‐11.480**	   -­‐0.000**	   2.025	   0.421	  
	   (-­‐3.07)	   (-­‐3.07)	   1.71	   1.69	  
LEVERAGE	   -­‐7.797***	   -­‐0.000***	   -­‐0.619	   -­‐0.129	  
	   (-­‐3.42)	   (-­‐3.42)	   (-­‐1.24)	   (-­‐1.23)	  	  	  	  
SC_OPER_CASHFLOW	   -­‐15.300**	   -­‐0.000**	   1.409	   0.293	  
	   (-­‐3.12)	   (-­‐3.12)	   1.24	   1.21	  
BIG4_AUDITOR	   -­‐5.812***	   -­‐0.113	   	   	  
	   (-­‐3.73)	   (-­‐1.01)	   	   	  
GOV_INDEX	   -­‐2.088*	   -­‐0.000*	   -­‐0.21	   -­‐0.044	  
	   (-­‐2.17)	   (-­‐2.17)	   (-­‐0.70)	   (-­‐0.70)	  	  	  	  
CEOCOMP_MIX	   5.667*	   0.000*	   1.93	   0.401	  
	   2.08	   2.08	   1.57	   1.59	  
DEC_INCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	   1.188***	   0.000***	   0.036	   0.007	  
	   3.39	   3.39	   1.21	   1.22	  
FINANCE	   0.629	   0	   -­‐0.635*	   -­‐0.108**	  	  
	   1.33	   0.08	   (-­‐2.45)	   (-­‐2.93)	  	  	  	  
_INTERCEPT	   -­‐3.747	   	   -­‐2.864*	   	  
	   (-­‐1.62)	   	   (-­‐2.54)	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
N	   332	   	   332	   	  
Pseudo-­‐R2	   0.697	   	   0.063	   	  
	  
*	  p<0.05;	  *p<0.1;**	  p<0.01;***	  p<0.001	  
	  
Variable	  	  Definitions:	  
	  
(1)	  LOSS_AVOID	  =	  1	  if	  a	  firm’s	  net	  income	  scaled	  by	  the	  market	  value	  of	  equity,	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Table	  10	  (continued)	  
	  
(2)	  DECLINE_AVOID	  =	  1	  if	  a	  firm’s	  change	  in	  net	  income	  from	  the	  prior	  fiscal	  year	  
scaled	  by	  its	  lagged	  market	  value	  of	  equity	  is	  greater	  than	  zero	  and	  less	  than	  or	  
equal	  to	  0.01.
STRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	  =	  Stringency	  score.	  
HIGH_GOVxSTRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	  	  =	  Dummy	  variable	  for	  high	  governance	  
interacted	  with	  stringency.	  
ABNORMAL_ACCRUALS	  =	  Abnormal	  accruals	  computed	  from	  the	  Modified	  Jones	  
Model	  as	  modified	  by	  Dechow	  et	  al.	  (1995)	  with	  the	  McNichols	  (2002)	  and	  Francis	  
et	  al.	  (2005)	  revenue	  growth	  and	  property,	  plant,	  and	  equipment	  (PPE)	  adjustments	  
and	  the	  Ball	  and	  Shivakumar	  (2006)	  non-­‐linear	  adjustment	  
LEVERAGE	  =	  (Total	  current	  assets	  plus	  long-­‐term	  debt),	  scaled	  by	  total	  assets.	  
SC_OPER_CASHFLOW	  =	  Net	  cash	  flow	  from	  operations,	  scaled	  by	  lagged	  total	  assets.	  
BIG4_AUDITOR	  =	  1	  if	  the	  firm	  employed	  a	  Big	  4	  auditor	  during	  the	  fiscal	  year.	  
GOV_INDEX	  =	  Value	  of	  the	  governance	  index.	  (This	  variable	  was	  omitted	  from	  the	  
earnings	  decline	  regression	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  variation.)	  
CEOCOMP_MIX=	  Percentage	  of	  CEO	  compensation	  that	  is	  incentive-­‐based.	  If	  net	  
income	  is	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  zero,	  this	  variable	  takes	  on	  a	  value	  of	  one.	  
DEC_INCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	  =	  The	  decile	  rank	  of	  the	  dollar	  value	  of	  the	  CEO’s	  
total	  incentive	  compensation,	  scaled	  by	  net	  income,	  as	  compared	  to	  all	  other	  firms	  
with	  available	  data	  in	  Compustat.	  
FINANCE	  =	  1	  if	  a	  firm’s	  percentage	  change	  in	  long-­‐term	  debt	  is	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  
to	  20%	  or	  it’s	  percentage	  change	  in	  common	  shares	  outstanding	  is	  greater	  than	  or	  
equal	  to	  10%.	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Table	  11	  
Sample	  Selection	  for	  Clawback	  Stringency	  Determinants	  Model	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
Panel	  A:	  Stringency	  Determinants	  Sample	   	  	  
	  
Observations	  
1.	  Voluntary	  Clawback	  Firms	  Identified	   286	  	  
Minus:	  Firms	  with	  missing	  Execucomp	  data	   67	  	  
2.	  Data	  after	  deleting	  firms	  missing	  Execucomp	  values	   219	  	  
Minus:	  Firms	  with	  missing	  financial	  Data	   8	  	  
3.	  Data	  with	  all	  financial	  control	  variables	   211	  	  
Minus:	  Firms	  with	  Missing	  Governance	  Data	   8	  	  
4.	  Data	  with	  abnormal	  accruals,	  all	  financial	  control	  variables,	  and	  all	  governance	  data	   203	  	  
Minus:	  Firms	  with	  insufficient	  detail	  to	  compute	  adoption	  speed	   2	  	  
5.	  Data	  with	  abnormal	  accruals,	  all	  financial	  control	  variables,	  all	  governance	  data,	  and	  
adoption	  speed	   201	  	  
Minus:	  Firms	  with	  insufficient	  detail	  to	  code	  for	  stringency	   12	  	  
6.	  Final	  Sample:	  firms	  for	  which	  all	  data	  is	  available,	  including	  stringency	   189	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Table	  12	  
Descriptive	  Statistics	  for	  Clawback	  Stringency	  Determinants	  Model	  
	  
Panel	  A:	  Clawback	  Stringency	  Determinants	  Model	  Sample	  (189	  observations)	   	  













STRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   9.339	   2.056	   8	   9	   	   11	  
GOV_INDEXxINCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	   -­‐0.001	   0.037	   -­‐0.006	   0.002	   0.010	  
GOV_INDEX_LAG1	   -­‐0.149	   0.802	   -­‐0.66	   -­‐0.33	   0.33	  
CEOCOMP_MIX_LAG1	   0.807	   0.156	   0.770	   0.847	   0.904	  
CEO_TURNOVER_LAG1	   0.111	   0.315	   0	   0	   0	  
GOODWILL_IMPAIR_LAG1	   0.349	   0.478	   0	   0	   1	  
LN_ASSET_LAG1	   8.651	   1.623	   7.481	   8.508	   9.966	  
ADOPTION_SPEED	   1.974	   0.981	   1	   2	   3	  
CAPITAL_INTENSITY_LAG1	   0.270	   0.227	   0.089	   0.202	   0.402	  
IND_AVG_RDTOSALE_LAG1	   4.112	   12.103	   0.012	   0.173	   0.688	  
UTIL_FIRM	   0.143	   0.351	   0	   0	   0	  
FINANCE	   0.265	   0.442	   0	   0	   1	  
	  
	  
Panel	  B:	  Comparison	  of	  High-­‐Stringency	  and	  Low-­‐Stringency	  Adopting	  Firms	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	   High-­‐Stringency	   Low-­‐Stringency	  
	   Adopters	   Adopters	  
	   (76	  firms)	   (113	  firms)	  
Variable	   Mean	   St.	  Dev.	   Mean	   St.	  Dev.	  
STRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   11.474	   1.238	   7.903	   0.945	  
GOV_INDEX_LAG1	   -­‐0.235	   0.810	   -­‐0.092	   0.794	  
CEOCOMP_MIX_LAG1	   0.789	   0.179	   0.819	   0.138	  
CEO_TURNOVER_LAG1	   0.079	   0.271	   0.133	   0.341	  
LN_ASSET_LAG1	   8.533	   1.625	   8.731	   1.623	  
GOODWILL_IMPAIR_LAG1	   0.355	   0.482	   0.345	   0.478	  
ADOPTION_SPEED	   1.947	   0.908	   1.991	   1.031	  
CAPITAL_INTENSITY	   0.281	   0.235	   0.263	   0.222	  
IND_AVG_RDTOSALE	   3.538	   10.677	   4.498	   13.007	  
FIRM_AGE	   33.039	   19.985	   36.726	   17.652	  
ROA_LAG1	   0.059	   0.104	   0.046	   0.080	  
FINANCIAL_FIRM	   0.105	   0.309	   0.071	   0.258	  
UTIL_FIRM	   0.079	   0.271	   0.186	   0.391	  
FINANCE	   0.316	   0.468	   0.230	   0.423	  
GOV_INDEXxINCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	   0.004	   0.025	   -­‐0.004	   0.043	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Table	  13	  
Clawback	  Stringency	  Determinants	  Regression	  
	  
	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  Coefficient	   	  Marginal	  
Variable	   	  	  	  (Z-­‐statistic)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Effect	  
	   	   	  
STRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	   	   	  
GOV_INDEX_LAG1	   -­‐0.16	   0.014	  
	   (-­‐1.63)	   1.51	  
CEOCOMP_MIX_LAG1	   -­‐0.492	   0.043	  
	   (-­‐0.92)	   0.9	  
CEO_TURNOVER_LAG1	   -­‐0.168	   0.017	  
	   (-­‐0.70)	   0.62	  
GOODWILL_IMPAIR_LAG1	   0.093	   -­‐0.008	  
	   0.6	   (-­‐0.60)	  
LN_ASSET_LAG1	   0.004	   0	  
	   0.08	   (-­‐0.08)	  
ADOPTION_SPEED	   -­‐0.005	   0	  
	   (-­‐0.06)	   0.06	  
CAPITAL_INTENSITY_LAG1	   1.076**	   -­‐0.095*	  
	   2.86	   (-­‐2.36)	  
IND_AVG_RDTOSALE_LAG1	   -­‐0.015*	   0.001*	  
	   (-­‐2.28)	   2.01	  
UTIL_FIRM	   -­‐0.525*	   0.064	  
	   (-­‐2.04)	   1.48	  
FINANCE	   0.355	   -­‐0.027	  
	   1.96	   (-­‐1.95)	  
GOV_INDEX_xINCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_
NI	  
3.287	   -­‐0.29	  
	   1.55	   (-­‐1.45)	  
_CUT1	   -­‐1.823***	   	  
	   (-­‐3.44)	   	  
_CUT2	   -­‐1.018*	   	  
	   (-­‐1.99)	   	  
_CUT3	   -­‐0.313	   	  
	   (-­‐0.61)	   	  
_CUT4	   0.186	   	  
	   0.36	   	  
_CUT5	   0.457	   	  
	   0.89	   	  
_CUT6	   0.885	   	  
	   1.72	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   2.93	   	  
	   	   	  
_CUT8	   1.880***	   	  
	   3.52	   	  
_CUT9	   2.324***	   	  
	   4.09	   	  
N	   189	   	  	  	  	  189	  
Pseudo-­‐R2	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.029	   	  
*	  p<0.05;	  **	  p<0.01;***	  p<0.001	  
	  
Variable	  Definitions:	  
STRINGENCY_EQUALWEIGHT	  =	  Stringency	  score.	  
GOV_INDEX_LAG1	  =	  Value	  of	  the	  governance	  index.	  
CEOCOMP_MIX_REV_LAG1	  =	  Percentage	  of	  CEO	  compensation	  from	  the	  prior	  fiscal	  
year	  that	  is	  incentive-­‐based.	  If	  net	  income	  is	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  zero,	  this	  variable	  
takes	  on	  a	  value	  of	  one.	  
CEO_TURNOVER_LAG1	  =	  1	  if	  the	  CEO	  turned	  over	  during	  the	  prior	  fiscal	  year.	  
GOODWILL_IMPAIR_LAG1	  =	  1	  if	  there	  was	  a	  goodwill	  impairment	  during	  the	  fiscal	  
year	  prior	  to	  clawback	  adoption.	  
LN_ASSET_LAG1	  =	  Natural	  logarithm	  of	  total	  assets	  from	  the	  prior	  fiscal	  year-­‐end.	  
ADOPTION_SPEED	  =	  Number	  of	  years	  passed	  between	  firm’s	  clawback	  adoption	  and	  
the	  earliest	  clawback	  provision	  adoption	  for	  all	  clawback	  firms.	  
CAPITAL_INTENSITY_LAG1	  =	  net	  property,	  plant,	  and	  equipment,	  scaled	  by	  total	  
assets,	  in	  the	  fiscal	  year	  prior	  to	  clawback	  adoption.	  
IND_AVG_RDTOSALE	  _LAG1	  =	  industry	  average	  ratio	  of	  research	  and	  development	  
expense	  to	  revenue	  in	  the	  fiscal	  year	  prior	  to	  clawback	  adoption.	  
UTIL_FIRM	  =	  1	  if	  a	  firm	  has	  a	  2-­‐digit	  SIC	  Code	  between	  48	  and	  50,	  inclusive.	  
FINANCE	  =	  1	  if	  a	  firm’s	  percentage	  change	  in	  long-­‐term	  debt	  is	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  
to	  20%	  or	  it’s	  percentage	  change	  in	  common	  shares	  outstanding	  is	  greater	  than	  or	  
equal	  to	  10%.	  
GOV_INDEXxINCENTIVE_MAGNITUDE_NI	  =	  The	  dollar	  value	  of	  the	  CEO’s	  total	  
incentive	  (non-­‐salary	  based)	  compensation,	  scaled	  by	  net	  income,	  interacted	  with	  a	  
firm’s	  governance	  index	  score.	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